Humiliation and terrorism
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The real cause of terrorism is the decision to launch a terrorist campaign.
Michael Walzer

Introduction
In recent years, looking for an answer to the question what is behind the rise of political Islam and the terrorist attacks by the hand of a few of its advocates, a number of authors, and not the least, have put forward the view that some Muslims feel that their culture is superior, but at the same time fear that in today’s world their way of life is threatened and that their honor is at stake. Presumably, the resulting feelings of humiliation are among the causes of the terrorist attacks we have witnessed in recent years in New York, Madrid and London, and in Bali. Samuel Huntington, Robert D. Kaplan, Bernard Lewis, Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Jessica Stern and Jason Burke, have dwelled on this relationship between Muslim terrorism and the notions of honor and humiliation, and pride and shame. The rise in Muslim radicalism witnessed in recent years, they hold, is probably not best understood in religious terms alone. The motivation behind it is not primarily religious, but political.

Both inside and outside the Islamic world, the September 11 attacks have been linked to ‘the feeling of the loss of honor and dignity,’ a loss that supposedly is the result of the colonial heritage of the nation state - a concept at odds with Islamic culture - and globalization. Humiliation by Western dominance thus led to the revolutionary wave in Islam over the last decades, we are told. In this view, Bin Laden ‘seized on the notion of honor,’ blaming the West ‘for robbing the Muslims of their honor and dignity.’

There are three notions here that stand in need of some explanation: humiliation, dignity and honor. Avihai Margalit’s The Decent Society, written from the perspective that honor and humiliation ought to have a central place in political thought, as they are central in people’s lives, can provide a framework.

Humiliation, Margalit writes, is the injury of someone’s self-respect, or the violation of a person’s honor. It often consists of rejecting a human being from the human common wealth, for instance, by ignoring him or treating him as subhuman. According to William Miller, in his Humiliation - devoted to the complicated relation between humiliation, honor, shame and violence - this will often amount to humiliation ‘with a big H’.

Humiliation with a small h often consists of the deflation of pretension, and, as such, it ‘is the consequence of trying to live up to what we have no right to.’ Humiliation with a big H, on the other hand, also involves the deflation of pretension, but in that case,
‘the claim of the torturer, the concentration camp guard, the ideologies of ethnic, racial and religious genocide, is that the humanity of their victims is a pretense’\textsuperscript{19}. Margalit, writing mainly about humiliation with a big $H$, mentions the Arabs working in the occupied territories in Israel as an example of people in humiliating conditions: colonialism is another case\textsuperscript{14}. These two examples show that humiliation can be seen at two levels at least: within a society and on a global level. Margalit focuses on the first, where Huntington and others mainly write about the latter.

Dignity is the external aspect of self-respect, a descendant of the Latin \textit{dignitas}, or social honor\textsuperscript{15}. Although external, people attach great value to their dignity, and wounding it is often considered humiliating. And not without reason, according to Margalit: dignity, we read, is not a ‘show,’ but the behavioral expression of self-respect; it is not presentation, but representation\textsuperscript{16}. Prior to both humiliation, as an injury of personal honor, and dignity, as a form of social honor, is the somewhat archaic sounding notion of honor.

Honor is best understood by contrasting it with the more modern notion of conscience. Especially in its modern understanding as an ‘inner voice,’ conscience is more demanding than honor, presupposing moral autonomy (it might prompt someone to go against social norms); yet it lacks an important external component. Honor, on the contrary, has an important external component as it concerns both the value that someone allocates to himself \textit{and} the value others place on him; only in his or her relationships to others does it become clear whether or not someone is a man or woman of honor\textsuperscript{17}. On honor’s relationship with humiliation, Miller writes that ‘honor is above all the keen sensitivity to the experience of humiliation and shame, sensitivity manifested by the desire to be envied by others and the propensity to envy the successes of others ... The honorable person is one whose self-esteem and social standing is intimately dependent on the esteem or envy he or she actually elicits in others’\textsuperscript{18}.

After this short outline of some key terms, the remainder of this article looks into today’s prevailing view in the West, which sees honor as something obsolete and archaic and not as a legitimate motive. The article then turns to one of honor’s possible strongholds in modern times, (political) Islam, and the role humiliation might have in the motivation of its faithful advocates. Some insight into the way honor and humiliation can influence people might lead to a better understanding of the mechanisms behind Muslim fundamentalism. According to al-Qaeda expert Jason Burke, the ‘perception that a belligerent West is set on the humiliation, division and eventual conquest of the Islamic world is at the root of Muslim violence. The militants believe they are fighting a last-ditch battle for the survival of their society, culture, religion and way of life’\textsuperscript{19}.
Honor and shame in Western culture

Although some domains of modern life, such as sports, politics and business, seem difficult to understand without taking honor into account, clearly honor has lost much of its appeal as a guide in matters of morality in the modern West. According to most authors, our culture nowadays is individualistic, and honor and shame are therefore, though debatable, probably less relevant than they once were. Autonomy is the ideal, the way we want to be; other-directedness is the regrettable reality, and the way many people are. Most of us believe in a free subject who chooses his or her own way through life, not needing the help judgments of others may offer, or the inhibition that the sense of shame can be. We are supposedly less concerned by how our behavior might look in the eyes of others; face and reputation are no longer of overriding importance. Instead, we have put our faith in conscience: the dominant view is that we, contrary to our predecessors, live in a guilt culture, not a shame culture. Anthropologist Ruth Benedict and classicist Eric Dodds are among the best known proponents of this view.

We often tend to see this shift from a shame culture to a guilt culture as a moral improvement. Lawrence Kohlberg’s influential model of moral development, a three-level (and six-stage) model, is paradigmatic for this way of thinking. According to this model, children are egoistic and calculating at the preconventional level, the one thing keeping them from misbehaving being their fear of punishment. Once at the conventional level, they are also sensitive to peer pressure and concerned about their reputation. Adherence to universal ethics is deemed the highest, post-conventional or ‘principled’ level. It is commonly thought that societies, like children, go through different phases of moral development. In this view, the Greeks and Romans of old were ‘children, and young children, in a Piagetian tale of moral development. This supposedly also holds true for those living in Islamic cultures. Other than the West, these cultures have remained more collectivist and they are therefore more likely to give honor and shame a place. They still are, and probably will remain, shame cultures. Honor and reputation are more important in these societies, sometimes to a degree that makes them difficult to understand for Western observers. However, not only is their sense of honor stronger, they also feel that their way of life is threatened by Western culture, which is sometimes seen as both inferior and seductive at the same time. If this is true, humiliation and alienation are among the root causes of Muslim terrorism. The following two sections look into these possible, and related, motives for terrorism.

Humiliation and political Islam

Samuel Huntington, bluntly stating that it is not Islamic fundamentalism that poses a problem for the West, but Islam, writes about Islam as a civilization whose people ‘are
convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power. In addition, Muslims, writes another author, 'have a worldview that entitles them to dominate. But to the contrary, they are dominated by others, to whom they feel thanks to their divine revelation - superior. They share this sense of superiority with the West, together with a conviction of universality, and a desire to expand. Despite its diminishing role in the world, the West is still able to sustain this feeling of superiority, but in Muslim countries, lagging behind in more than one respect, the modern successes of Christian empires were felt as an intolerable humiliation.

Talking about Islam, or Islamic culture, in such general terms is an awkward enterprise, however. As Clifford Geertz pointed out in his thorough article on the host of, sometimes hostile, books on Islam that have seen the light since September 11, it often does not do justice to the differences between the different creeds of Islam (and Islamism), and the different cultures and peoples that are among its believers. That Islamic culture is a shame culture seems beyond much dispute, however, and this it is not a matter of religion alone. Honor and shame are alien to Christianity, but they are not overly important in the Koran, either. Still, these concepts are not at all alien to most societies where Islam is the dominant religion, predating the rise of this religion. What seems to be alien to these societies, however, is the Christian idea that pride is the most deadly sin, and humility a virtue.

While declining in the West, the notions of honor and shame seem only to gain importance in Islamic societies. Although Islam, like Christianity, is a universalistic religion, group loyalties are becoming more important, not less:

*The failure to create a just and compassionate society leads people to fall back to ideas of tribal honor and revenge. Divisions in society deepen on the basis of blood and custom. Killing and conflict are encouraged. The honor of the group and – if it is attacked – the need to take revenge become more important than worshiping God in peace and engendering compassion in society.*

According to another author, Arab society today is characterized by strong group loyalties and exaggerated forms of shame. This emphasis on group loyalty, always stronger in collectivist cultures than in individualistic cultures, can become excessive, and those outside the group are accused of dishonorable behavior.

Sensitivity to honor and shame makes people vulnerable to feelings of humiliation. Writing about 'real or perceived national humiliation by Israeli policies' terrorism researcher Jessica Stern found that:

*It is not just the violence; it is the pernicious effect of repeated, small humiliations that*
add up to a feeling of nearly unbearable despair and frustration, and a willingness on the part of some to do anything - even commit atrocities - in the belief that attacking the oppressor will restore their sense of dignity.

The Palestinian terrorists are not alone in this: talking to terrorists from Burleson, Texas to Islamabad for her book *Terror in the Name of God*, Stern found humiliation mentioned most in the interviews she held.

Those I interviewed cite many reasons for choosing a life of holy war, and I came to despair of identifying a single root cause of terrorism. But the variable that came up most frequently was not poverty or human rights abuses, but perceived humiliation. Humiliation emerged at every level of the terrorist groups I studied - leaders and followers.

The ‘New World Order’ is a source of humiliation for Muslims. And for the youth of Islam, it is better to carry arms and defend their religion with pride and dignity than to submit to this humiliation. Part of the mission of jihad is to restore Muslims’ pride in the face of humiliation. Violence, in other words, restores the dignity of humiliated youth.

That the New World Order is humiliating to Muslims, is something al-Qaeda’s second man Ayman al-Zawahiri claimed. al-Qaeda’s first man, Osama bin Laden stated in his 7 October 2001 videotape that Muslims had suffered humiliation by the West for almost eighty years, e.g. since the defeat of the Ottoman sultanate in 1918. In his *Letter to America* he declared that the governments of ‘our countries’ are agents of America, and that they ‘give us a taste of humiliation’.

It is not clear whether this is humiliation with a big H, or a small h. Although some Muslims might feel that they are treated as sub-human, part of the frustration that fuels the anger of some adherents of political Islam seems to be a consequence of not being able to live up to the pretension of being a superior civilization. Clearly, this is humiliation with a small h. The double standards of the West, both in politics and in the media, in tolerating regimes in the Muslim world with a very bad human rights record, as, for instance, the regimes of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Algeria and, until recently, Iraq, and that would never be accepted in the West, suggest, however, that the peoples subjugated by those regimes are seen as having ‘neither concern nor capacity for human decency’. Stern concludes in the final chapter of her book that people who join religious terrorist groups ‘start out feeling humiliated, enraged that they are viewed by some other as second class’. This might be a reason for feelings of humiliation with a big H.
The quotes above show that the reaction to humiliation is often a violent one. In her final chapter, Stern states she considers humiliation an ‘important risk factor’. Prominent Islamists such as Sayyid Qutb and Ayman Zawahiri, the intellectual leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and of al-Qaeda, respectively, argue that violence is a way to cure Muslim youth of the pernicious effects of centuries of humiliation at the hands of the West\(^46\). Disturbingly, the ‘word humiliation, alas, is now coming up in Iraq as well,’ Stern writes in an essay written after the invasion of Iraq - an invasion that in her view strengthened terrorists groups\(^47\).

**Alienation and political Islam**

Interestingly, and possibly related to the sense of superiority mentioned above, there seems to be a shaming element in suicide attacks, presenting ‘a challenge to a spectator’s own lack of faith or inaction’\(^48\). The willingness in some Muslim societies, with its often young populations and sometimes dim prospects for the ambitious\(^49\), to accept casualties and to make sacrifices, seems to be considerably higher than in the West. As a Taliban fighter of undisclosed origin remarked, ‘they love Pepsi-Cola, but we love death’\(^50\). This brings us to another important point: the view some Muslims harbor about the West.

The feelings of Muslim superiority of some advocates of political Islam are based on the assumptions that Muslims do have a sense of honor, and do have a sense of community. So, some of them not only feel humiliated, they also feel contempt for their humiliators who are seen as morally degenerate and, consequently, weak\(^51\). This Western weakness does not only relate to the West’s presumed unwillingness to accept casualties, but also its reluctance to *inflict* casualties among the innocent in defense of its own interests\(^52\). This view might well be mistaken\(^53\). However, whether true or not, in the eyes of bin Laden and others, America is for this reason a paper tiger, easier to defeat than the Soviet Union in Afghanistan\(^54\). The political Islamists’ hatred is not constrained by respect for the West’s military capabilities, and they frequently refer to earlier ‘shameful’ retreats from Vietnam, the Lebanon and Somalia\(^55\). This partly explains why all suicide attacks of the past two decades have been aimed at democracies: terrorists see them as soft\(^56\).

As Buruma and Margalit pointed out in their recent book, this view is part of a dehumanizing strand of thought\(^57\), occidentalism, that goes back a long way and has many different manifestations. Some telling forms of occidentalism in the past were the Japanese view of the West during World War II, and the Romantic criticism of modern society in eighteenth century Europe, the birthplace of occidentalism and orientalism alike. The common denominator of most forms of occidentalism is the view that the
West is nowadays characterized by calculative, scientific thinking, mercantilism, and a loss of the sense of community. The *Gesellschaft* replaced the *Gemeinschaft*, in the words of the German nineteenth-century sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies. Today, occidentalism is found among the advocates of political Islam, who sometimes harbor views of the West that are often as simplified as the pictures of the Islam that have been held by many Christians over the ages. In the eyes of some supporters of the political Islam, moreover, living both outside and inside the West, Westerners are devoid of the sense of honor, their permissiveness being a clear sign of this.

Muslim occidentalists thereby largely underwrite the view generally accepted in Western countries that community and honor did play a role in the West in earlier times, but have disappeared from the stage since, and that the West can now be characterized as an individualistic guilt-culture, whereas in Muslim countries honor, community, and the related willingness to make sacrifices, are still present. Other than most Western authors, they definitely do not see this as a moral improvement.

**Conclusion**

The idea that terrorism is a result of wounded honor and humiliation by the West seems to lay part of the problem, and responsibility, at the doorstep of the West. Not many people in the West are defending terrorism, but some are finding excuses. And although looking for explanations should not be confused with justifying terrorism, it sometimes borders, in some respects, on the apologetic. Stern’s remark that violence is a way of restoring dignity after being humiliated, quoted above, somewhat echoes Sartre’s defense of violence as a last resort for young Algerians. For a number of reasons, this can be seen as an unjustified form of blaming the victim.

First, obviously, it is not at all clear whether the majority of terrorists actually act out of feelings of humiliation: “[t]he hundreds of groups, cells, movements, even individuals, lumped together under the rubric ‘Islamic Terrorism’ is enormously diverse. Individuals and groups turn to terrorism for a variety of reasons, some of which, though not all, may be shared by others.” Nonetheless, even the author of this passage, Jason Burke, seems to hold the view that humiliation is one of the reasons shared by many terrorists. A host of other reasons, for instance, envy, personal failure and the wish for self-glorification might play an important role, however.

Secondly, it is debatable whether the advocates of political Islam have a sound reason to feel humiliated. Margalit’s distinction between humiliation in a psychological and a normative sense is crucial here. People with lower status, for instance, tend to feel humiliated more often than that they actually are. In today’s world, citizens of Islamic societies might consider themselves lower-status people. Margalit writes on humiliation
within pluralistic societies: ‘A vulnerable group with a history of humiliations and suspicion of its surroundings, especially suspicion of the dominant culture, is liable to interpret any criticism as humiliation. The hegemonic form of life may well be indifferent to such a peripheral form of life, so that it has no intention of criticizing it because it does not perceive it as a threat. The dominant culture may even consider the other culture too marginal to be worth criticizing. But such disregard is liable to be interpreted by an overly sensitive, vulnerable group as insulting’\(^67\). In this case, what holds true within a society might also apply to a world scale.

In the third place: even if there is a sound reason to feel humiliated, be it with a big H or a small h, this of course forms no legitimate reason for terrorism, just like injured family honor does not justify honor killings, no matter how important the family honor is to the murderer. Margalit, although writing on humiliation, nonetheless depicts cruelty as the greater evil\(^68\), and it is this evil terrorists have taken refuge to. As Walzer writes in his *Just and Unjust Wars*, insults ‘are not occasions for war, any more than they are (these days) occasions for duels’\(^69\). Of course, Walzer is writing about states, but there is no compelling reason why terrorists should have more leeway in this than states. Notwithstanding Walzer’s arguments, wounded honor does seem to play a role in the motivation of at least some terrorists.

Finally, violence as a way of restoring dignity raises a few ‘obvious and crippling questions’\(^70\). Addressing Sartre’s notorious remark, made in defense of Algerian terrorism, that ‘to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone, doing away with oppressor and oppressed at the same time: what remains is a dead man and a free man’\(^71\), Walzer wonders whether a one-to-one relationship - one European for one Algerian - is necessary\(^72\). Today, one might wonder whether it takes the killing of one European or American to restore the dignity of one humiliated Muslim. In that case, there might be not enough of them. However, of course, the vast majority of Muslims, although they may feel humiliated, for instance, by the invasion of Iraq, or the presence of American troops elsewhere in the Arabic World, do not sympathize with the terrorists’ methods and reject their extremism\(^73\). Especially attacks like the one in Madrid, making innocent victims, but with the attackers making sure not to be killed in the process, might alienate moderate Muslims from the radical ones, diminishing the number of supporting sympathizers terrorists are depending on for support, money and a safe refuge\(^74\).

Notes
2. ‘In the history of peoples, shame has always been associated with honor and pride.’


10. Margalit, The Decent Society, 100-112.


12. Miller, Humiliation, 137, 145.


17. Charles H. Cooley, an American sociologist from the early twentieth century, defined honor aptly as ‘a finer kind of self-respect. It is used to mean either something one feels regarding himself, or something that other people think and feel regarding him, and so illustrates by the accepted use of language the fact that the private and social aspects of self are inseparable.’ Charles H. Cooley, Human nature and the Social Order (New York: Charles Scribner, 1902) According to anthropologist Pitt-Rivers someone’s honor is ‘the value in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society. It is his estimation of his own worth, his claim to pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim, his excellence recognized by society, his right to pride.’ J. Pitt-Rivers, ‘Honor and Social Status,’ in Honor and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society, ed. J.G. Peristiany (Chicago: Midway Reprint, 1974), 21.

18. Miller, Humiliation, 84.


20. See on politics and business Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last
21. This view has been made popular by authors as Erich Fromm, Abraham Maslow and David Riesman.


37. Lynn, *Battle*, 313


39. Stern, *Terror in the Name of God*, 62. According to John Elster, ‘[m]ost writers on the Palestinian suicide bombers emphasize the intense resentment caused by the
daily humiliations that occur in interaction with the Israeli forces. ’ ‘Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions,’ in: Making Sense of Suicide Missions, ed. Diego Gambetta, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 245.


42. Lewis, Crisis of Islam, i.


44. Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, 80.

45. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 281-282.

46. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 285.

47. Stern, Terrorism's new Mecca.

48. Burke, al-Qaeda, 35.

49. See for instance Kaplan

50. Buruma and Margalit, Occidentalism, 49.


53. See, for instance, Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), 356-368 and Pape, Dying to Win, 44

54. 'As I said, our boys were shocked by the low morale of the American soldier and they realized that the American soldier was just a paper tiger. He was unable to endure the strikes that were dealt to his army, so he fled, and America had to stop all its bragging and all that noise it was making in the press after the Gulf War (…)' Interview with Osama bin Laden, by ABC's John Miller, Http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html. (Viewed on December 1, 2005).

55. Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, 125.

56. Pape, Dying to Win, 39, 44-45.

57. Buruma and Margalit, Occidentalism, 5 and 106. See for dehumanizing also Vogelaar's contribution to this issue.


59. Buruma and Margalit, Occidentalism, 134.
60. Walzer, Arguing about War, 52.
61. ‘We need to stop confusing justification with explanation. Learning what motivates enemies does not mean sympathising with them. Merely saying that the bombers are mad, when there is no evidence that militants are mentally ill or backward, and when contemporary radical Islam clearly has its roots in the conditions of the modern world, does not help.’ Jason Burke, ‘Seven ways to stop the terror,’ The Observer, Sunday August 7, 2005. Http://www.guardian.co.uk/attackonlondon/story/0,,1544321,00.html. (Viewed on November 27, 2005).
63. Burke, al-Qaeda, 24
66. Miller, Humiliation, 144.
70. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 205
71. Sartre, The Wretched of the Earth, 148.
72. Ibid.
73. Burke, al-Qaeda, 35
74. See also Jason Burke, ‘Who did it - and what was their motive?’ The Observer, Sunday July 10, 2005. H t t p : / / w w w . g u a r d i a n . c o . u k / a t t a c k o n l o n d o n / c o m m e n t / story/0,16141,1525470,00.html. (Viewed on November 27, 2005).