Journal of Civil Society

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcis20

Breakpoint or Binder: Religious Engagement in Dutch Civil Society

Gürkan Çelik

Department of Business, Law and Media, Windesheim University of Applied Sciences, Zwolle, The Netherlands

Published online: 05 Jul 2013.

To cite this article: Gürkan Çelik (2013) Breakpoint or Binder: Religious Engagement in Dutch Civil Society, Journal of Civil Society, 9:3, 248-267, DOI: 10.1080/17448689.2013.813733

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2013.813733

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Breakpoint or Binder: Religious Engagement in Dutch Civil Society

GÜRKAN ÇELIK

Department of Business, Law and Media, Windesheim University of Applied Sciences, Zwolle, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT Civil society as a social sphere is constantly subjected to change. Using the Dutch context, this article addresses the question whether religiously inspired engagement is a binder or a breakpoint in modern societies. The author examines how religiously inspired people in the Netherlands involve themselves in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and voluntary activities. Religious involvement and social engagement in different European countries are compared and discussed. In addition, the author explores the models of civil society and applies these to both the Christian and Islamic civil society in the Netherlands. Using four religious ‘identity organizations’ as case studies, this article discusses the interaction of Christian and Islamic civil society related to secularized Dutch society. The character and intentions of religiously inspired organizations and the relationship between religious and secular involvement are examined. This study also focuses on the attitude of policymakers towards religiously inspired engagement and government policy on ‘identity organizations’ in the Netherlands.

KEY WORDS: Religious engagement, religious identity organizations, Dutch civil society, Islamic civil society, Christian civil society

Introduction

Religion and religious activism are at the centre of public debate in the Netherlands. It is under question once again whether religion is a binder or a breakpoint in modern societies. Although it is acknowledged that religion is a source of goodness, value, and motivation to participate, it does not mean it cannot also be experienced as problematic. This is shown in public debates about issues such as headscarves, Islamic radicalization, shaking hands with someone of the opposite sex, ritual slaughter, admission of women to political office, and the position of homosexual teachers in schools.

How does religion manifest itself in secularized Dutch society? To answer these questions, this study examined the character and intentions of religiously inspired organizations and the relationship between religious and secular involvement. It also focused
on the attitude of politics towards religiously inspired engagement and government policy on ‘identity organizations’.

This article is not primarily about political and government decisions per se but explores their relationships with Dutch civil society. It assesses the opportunities and risks of religiously inspired social engagement, and in the light of that discusses religious identity organizations. A comparison of the civil society of the ‘majority group’, referred to as ‘Christian civil society’ in this article, is made with the emerging Islamic ‘minority’ civil society in a secularized context in order to add critical perspectives to the study of Islamic organizations.

In addition to a systematic review of the relevant literature in society and previous research, this study has combined qualitative interviewing with case studies of four Dutch identity organizations: two Christian-inspired and two Islamic-inspired. These are typical cases which may be employed as exemplars or prototypes. Fifteen respondents were interviewed by means of a topic list and further specific questions per respondent group were categorized around three subthemes distilled from the literature review and expert interviews: interaction with and between groups; experience of working with a religious organization in civil society; and financial cooperation with local authorities. These subthemes allowed the interviews to be coded. Then all relevant fragments were sorted thematically, which enabled a structured analysis and comparison. The following criteria were used to select the respondents for this study: different political parties, civil society organizations operating at local or national level; contacts of these organizations with public authorities; diverse ethnic and religious background; expertise in terms of (religious) civil society; and balance between religious and non-religious perspectives.

Following a brief description of the civil society concept, Christian and Islamic civil society in the Netherlands is sketched and the interaction of Christian and Islamic civil society with secularized Dutch society examined. Finally, general conclusions are drawn and discussed.

Civil Society as a Social Sphere

Opinions are divided as to whether religious organizations and religious groups should belong to civil society. If we define civil society as independent of state or market, it obviously offers space for churches, temples, and mosques, but not for a state church; if we define it as a social sphere for voluntary associations, it is less clear that those religious organizations can be included. The self-image of religious communities does not fit with the idea of self-conscious human freewill (Kennedy, 2010). In fact, there is seldom voluntary membership of such communities (people attend them as children) and the possibility of voluntary retirement from the community is not always offered.

Civil society organizations can be voluntary associations but also foundations or other legal structures such as federations, trade associations, educational institutions, and mosques. Voluntary associations are predominant in civil society and are coherent in terms of their mutual relationships. Associations with religious or non-religious objectives belong to civil society, including those associations managed by believers.

The traditional forms of voluntary organizations tend to change. Religious communities refer to socio-religious groups that produce, follow, and support a particular interpretation of religion through their activities and organizational networks (Yükleyen, 2012, p. 3). Individual movements become solid organizations; they attract and lose followers,
merge or are eliminated. Other movements and organizations come up with new ideas. Regardless of the dynamics within civil society, there are changes in the character of the organizations and individual activities. Associations become less intense, and members often behave more like customers than members. *Face-to-face organizations* have partly made way for *mailing list organizations* which involve no meetings between members or sponsors. Voluntary work is also changing. Traditional forms of voluntary work are difficult owing to cultural individualization and the busy schedules of individuals (van Houten, 2010). Relationships become increasingly loose, are more temporary, and are organized in a branched connection with associations, schools, and businesses. Instead of engaging in strong, established relationships and daily meetings—as was the case with the old voluntary activities—people commit themselves, individually or in groups, to temporary projects for the benefit of others. Social media play an increasingly important role in mobilizing this voluntary effort (Dekker, Çelik, & Cremers, 2011, p. 14). The new organizational frameworks are lighter, more volatile, and less transparent than the old ones (van Houten, 2010).

Civil society organizations can operate through different legal mechanisms. There are large and small foundations and associations, especially in the field of social welfare and religiously inspired groups. In the Netherlands, the Law of Social Support (WMO³) promotes societal self-government and voluntary associations (that is, civil society) and encourages citizen initiatives and the responsibility of citizens for each other (Dautzenberg & van Westerlaak, 2007). Increasingly, all these civil organizations in the Netherlands are developing a more important role in terms of policy-making.

Finally, religious associations play a role by telling stories that inspire people to commit themselves. Research on the meaning of the ‘divine’ to the Dutch population shows that religious people can put their aspirations more easily into words (Dekker, Çelik, & Cremers, 2011). Their motivation for volunteering is often better argued than the motivation of non-religious people, who often state simply that ‘Someone has to do it’ or ‘Because I like it’. Apparently, they cannot or dare not articulate why it is of importance for them to do something really good. That does not mean that the justification for civil commitment must be religious, but a clear motivation can help convert intentions into action.

**Three Models of Civil Society**

Discussions about the concept of civil society rotate around three main axes. These models arose in the aftermath of the Cold War and within the context of increasing globalization (İçduygü, Meydanoğlu, & Sert, 2011; Mandaville, 2010).

The first axis involves the model of a civil society emerging from within, without any influence from the government. This model specifically refers to the historical developments that resulted from the demand by the urban population for civil liberties and individual rights. The idea of the formation of civil society from within indicates the development of bottom-up organizations and is in parallel with the enlargement of individual rights and freedoms.

The second model compares civil society with the quality and character of the democracy in the immediate area. This model is rooted in the discussions of a good society and sees civil society as a means by which democracy is initiated and established. It states that the primary means for change, especially in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes with a strong government influence, is the creation of an independent civil society that is even
able to oppose the system. In this respect, civil society is seen as both a result and an indicator of democratization.

The third model is based on a combination of both the first and second approaches. Civil society is not approached as an organizational arena that spontaneously appears in liberal economic and political systems, and it is not perceived to be apolitical. This third approach rather defines civil society as an area of associational life with various social, economic, and political functions (Keyman, 2006). Civil society organizations generally do not pursue political goals, even if they are in contact with or lobbying a government. Despite the fact that civil society organizations have no political ambitions, it does not mean that they are neutral actors in the social sphere and the political arena. On the contrary, socio-religious issues are not neutral. They are social phenomena, which always generate political forces (Çelik, 2010). Thus, civil society organizations—whether religious or not—cannot be impartial as regards policy and political decisions while working on a solution to the problems in society.

A Reflection on Civil Society in Muslim Countries

The aforementioned three models of civil society have important implications for the understanding of civil society in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. The first model describes a civil society emerging from within as a result of the development of civil and individual rights. For a long time it was questionable to what extent this was possible in Muslim countries such as Turkey, Indonesia, Morocco, and Egypt, where Western modernization took place at a much later time in their history. This issue connects the traditional weakness of those civil societies with the ‘late and slow process of modernization’ that was experienced in many Muslim countries (Kalaycioğlu, 2002, pp. 247–273).

At present, civil society in a number of Muslim countries is characterized by the second model, which relates the development of civil society to the quality and character of local democracy (Norton, 1995, 2001). This includes Turkey, Indonesia, and countries in North Africa and the Middle East, where the Arab Spring started at the beginning of 2011. The regimes in these regions are under increasing pressure from their citizens. It is interesting that governments in Muslim countries are increasingly receptive of civil society organizations and their initiatives to modernize their country in a changing world. In those countries civil society has emerged as an influential factor in the transformation of the worldview of their administrators and politicians. In rich and poor states alike, incipient civilian movements are demanding a voice in politics and the public domain. Recent political developments in those countries clearly show the vitality and dynamism of civil society, the mélange of associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, parties, and groups which provide a buffer between state and citizen. Civil society organizations are increasingly at the forefront of political liberalization in Muslim countries.

Civil society in many Muslim countries is experiencing a fast transformation. The number of organizations (religious and non-religious) and their impact continue to grow. Religious organizations such as mosque-building associations function as grassroots organizations for the Muslim community. For example, in Turkey, this is the case for 18.13% of approximately 86,031 associations (İçdüyu, Meydanoglu, & Sert, 2011).

Civil society organizations work with social actors, the business world, and government agencies to manage social problems. They are emerging as relevant actors in the
development of Muslim countries and their democratization agenda. The organizations facilitate active citizenship and social commitment and contribute to the welfare of liberal democracy through the involvement of citizens. They are said to bring efficiency, transparency, and legitimacy to the state and create an environment for discussion and reflection between economic, social, and political actors.

A lack of civic involvement and weak organizational structures, however, remain an important challenge for many Muslim countries. In addition to these weaknesses, the impact of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is not always felt, and their relationship with the government is often not very efficient (Dekker, Çelik, & Creemers, 2011). It is legitimate for NGOs to exist and function independently of the state in many Muslim countries. Civil society organizations should be free to operate without excessive government interference and supervision. They are frequently subjected, however, to unwarranted interference in their activities. As a result, this can hinder civic engagement. More recently, when the government allows no room for solutions, civil society organizations have taken the lead in protests. Often, the existence of civil society has to be fought for and does not arise by itself. This was evidenced by the Arab Spring.

Finally, in countries with a longer democratic history, like the Netherlands, we see examples of the third model of civil society, where organizations develop activities in the social, economic, and political arenas. Dutch Islamic civil society organizations are increasingly learning how to position themselves as lobbyists for their rights—for example, to criticize new policy on religion-related issues such as ritual slaughter or the ban on wearing a headscarf in specific professions.

Christian and Islamic Civil Society in the Netherlands

Christianity is the mainstream of religious life in the Netherlands, followed by Islam. According to Putnam, churchgoers make a major contribution to the social capital of society. They are active within and on behalf of their own religious organizations, are more active than non-churchgoers, and they give more to general charities (Putnam, 2000; Putnam & Campbell, 2010). This has already been noted for the USA (Verba, Lehman Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Wilson & Janoski, 1995; Wuthnow & Hodgkinson, 1990).

In this section, data from several large-scale surveys are used to explore the situation in Europe and the Netherlands (Dekker, 2011, pp. 30–46). First, this study looks at the survey data of the European Values Study of 2008–2009 for all 27 countries of the European Union, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey. Table 1 shows the countries in ascending order of monthly church attendance (or visits to any other houses of prayer)—visible in the third column as ‘churchgoer’. This shows a range of rates of church attendance from 8% of the population in Sweden to 82% in Malta.

The first column indicates the proportion of the population which belongs to a religion, and the second column indicates the proportion of those who belong to a religion who share the Christian faith. They are active within and on behalf of their own religious organizations, are more active than non-churchgoers, and they give more to general charities (Putnam, 2000; Putnam & Campbell, 2010). This has already been noted for the USA (Verba, Lehman Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Wilson & Janoski, 1995; Wuthnow & Hodgkinson, 1990).

In this section, data from several large-scale surveys are used to explore the situation in Europe and the Netherlands (Dekker, 2011, pp. 30–46). First, this study looks at the survey data of the European Values Study of 2008–2009 for all 27 countries of the European Union, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey. Table 1 shows the countries in ascending order of monthly church attendance (or visits to any other houses of prayer)—visible in the third column as ‘churchgoer’. This shows a range of rates of church attendance from 8% of the population in Sweden to 82% in Malta.

The first column indicates the proportion of the population which belongs to a religion, and the second column indicates the proportion of those who belong to a religion who share the Christian faith. The latter rate is not much lower than the first for most countries—with the major exception of Turkey, where almost everyone supports the Islamic faith, followed by Bulgaria with its historic Muslim minority, and then countries with a large immigrant population (Spain, the UK, and Switzerland).

The subsequent columns indicate religious and secular voluntary work (fourth and fifth columns) and political activism. Although few people in the Netherlands belong to a faith
Table 1. Religious involvement and social engagement in Europe, in percentage of the population, eighteen years and older in 2008–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Religious a</th>
<th>Christian b</th>
<th>Church-goer c</th>
<th>Religious voluntary work d</th>
<th>Secular voluntary work e</th>
<th>Activist f</th>
<th>Position of churchgoers in secular voluntary work g</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UK</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a% of the population that belongs to a religion.
b% of the population that belongs to a Christian religion.
c% of the population who visits a church or any other religious house of prayer at least once a month.
d% of the population who does voluntary work for a religious or church organization.
e% of the population who does secular voluntary work (not for any religious or church organization).
f% of the population that participated in petitions, protests or boycotts.
gIndicates whether churchgoers (or visitors to another religious worship) are statistically significant (p < .05 two-tailed) overrepresented (+ and ++ at odds ratio >2) or underrepresented (−, no odds ratio <0.5) under the secular volunteers.

and the number of worshippers is limited (only in the Czech Republic and Estonia do people perceive themselves as less religious), the proportion of people who do religious voluntary work is the highest of all countries at 12%. Also, in terms of secular (non-religious) voluntary work, the Netherlands is at the top with 45%, followed by Luxembourg
(39%); Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, and Norway (all 35–36%). Regarding political activism, the Netherlands is an average performer (57%) and follows Sweden (84%), Norway (76%), Denmark (73%), France (73%), Switzerland (69%), the UK (67%), Luxembourg (65%), Belgium (64%), Germany (62%), Finland (60%), and Italy (60%).

This study’s interest is in connections on the individual level. The last column of Table 1 demonstrates the number of churchgoers who are over- or underrepresented in secular voluntary work. Both religious and secular volunteers are usually overrepresented in the Netherlands compared to other countries. According to this study, 54% of churchgoers and 42% of non-churchgoers are active in secular voluntary work or engage actively with society or politics. As regards activism, churchgoers differ less often from the rest of the population. If they did not, then churchgoers would be less active. In short, churchgoers are more active in non-religious voluntary work.

Survey data from the 1940s (the time of the pillarization) do not exist or were not readily available for use, but data between the 1970s and 2005 available from the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) have proved useful for this article. The SCP study, which covers only general voluntary work, shows that for a period of 30 years churchgoers were more likely to do voluntary work than non-churchgoers. Non-churchgoers, in this case, include both people outside the church and people who count themselves as members of a church but rarely or never attend it. These two groups cannot be clearly distinguished.

Additionally, more recent research involves Catholic and Protestant regular churchgoers and nominal church members who visit their church less than once a month. They are compared with people who do not visit any church or religious community (SCP, 2011). The groups are compared on three measures of voluntary work (general, specifically religious, and secular). When asked about their unpaid voluntary work for an institution or an organization, most people think of it as regular work. This describes 28% of the volunteers. More specifically, 9% mention voluntary work for religious organizations, whereas 44% of volunteers offer their time at a number of secular organizations such as sports clubs, communities, and schools. In addition, we can observe participation in collective activities at 31% and preparation for political protest (56%). When non-religious people are compared with churchgoers and nominal church members (both Catholic and Protestant), the results indicate that churchgoers and Protestants are the most active. Protestant churchgoers have the highest scores, and half of them are active in religious volunteering.

The differences which are shown in this section indicate that frequent attendance at a church (Catholic or Protestant) makes a greater difference to the number of volunteers than church membership alone. Given the differences between Catholics and Protestants, doctrine may not be entirely without effect. Possibly the differences are not to be found in the effects of churchgoing but should be sought in terms of palpable socio-demographic differences. Protestant churchgoers score high because this group mainly consists of older and better educated women, who according to research are more willing to do voluntary work and provide care in any case (Dekker, 2011, p. 38).

Driving Force behind the Great Commitment of Church Members

The Giving in the Netherlands Panel Survey (GINPS) conducted by the Centre for Philanthropic Studies at the VU University of Amsterdam offers valuable information about the
giving of money instead of time (voluntary work) (Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008). Up to 47% of all cash donations from households in 2009 were for ‘church and religion’ (Bekkers & Boonstoppel, 2011, p. 37). So religion appears to be a very important target for donations. The summary by Bekkers (2003) suggests that religious people also give more to secular causes than do the non-religious. The more orthodox and closed a faith group is, the more the members give, and the greater the amount for religious purposes. Particularly in the orthodox Calvinist movements, which are organized in smaller denominations outside the Protestant Church in the Netherlands (PCN), the old pillarized structure of Dutch society in which Catholics, Protestants, socialists, and liberals lived ‘apart and together’ (Vermeij, 2006, p. 19) is still active in limited areas. Social life is often directed strongly inwards and large amounts of donations and volunteering are devoted to own institutions. Some of the donations are for the Church and some for organizations that are identified as possessing the same spirit but are organized and formed outside it (Kennedy, 2010).

As stated above, churchgoers are more generous with their money and their time, but it is still not evident what comprises the driving force behind their voluntary work. Is it that the church serves as a social community in which social networks are easily mobilized for volunteering? Or is it the mission and values of the church? If the role of the church is a matter of networks, participation in other voluntary organizations should have a similar positive effect. Let us therefore compare churchgoers with sports club members.

Membership in a sports club usually involves active participation and contacts with other members. These associations create, like churches, many opportunities for voluntary work in the association. Members of sports organizations seem to do more voluntary work that is not directly related to sports than non-members do (44% versus 36%). Still, this difference is smaller than that between churchgoers and non-churchgoers doing secular volunteering (54% of churchgoers and 42% of non-churchgoers). Sportsmen and sportswomen volunteer more often just in their own sector. Therefore it seems that the reason so many churchgoers volunteer is not only because they are part of a social network; also important is that the church is a moral community. The values promoted within the church encourage people to participate in social activities and social engagement.

Several studies indicate that the rejection of the pursuit of self-interest and the support of altruistic values are higher among churchgoers than non-churchgoers. This emerged again in a recent US survey by Putnam and Campbell (2010), who assume that just participating in social networks of religious people—who espouse these values—has a positive effect on civil commitment, regardless of one’s own religiosity and religious practices.

Rising Islamic Civic Engagement in the Netherlands

As regards Islamic civil society in the Netherlands, there is a distinct trend towards greater social engagement. Muslims—just like non-Muslims—are able to organize themselves to create, express, and maintain a collective identity and group interests. Muslim minorities are increasingly taking part in civil society and participating in the process of influencing political and administrative systems and structures. Large ethnic minorities—that is, Turks, Moroccans, and Indonesians and their religious organizations—have established themselves in Dutch society. Their civil society organizations are demanding a voice within political processes and are important and instrumental in the functioning of government and the development of society. Muslim immigrants increasingly participate in public life through voluntary associations—as members of a sports club or an advocacy
group, for example. They are also donors to charitable foundations or volunteers at a community centre, library, care facility, or parent committee at their child’s school (Dekker, 2008). Through these voluntary connections, Muslims in the Netherlands come into contact with people outside their own informal networks.

Islamic civil society is not often mentioned in the literature, but there is little doubt that Muslim organizations, communities of mosques, and Islamic immigrant organizations are increasingly taking part in civil society. This is also the case with other religious institutions as well as the Dutch churches. It is a feature of most religions that they manifest themselves between the state and the market. For example, there are religious-oriented schools, as well as cultural and secular activities of transnational Muslim movements in the Netherlands and many other European countries.

As in other plural societies around the world, Islam is not only represented at an individual level but also has many institutions—organizations and associations such as immigrant organizations, Muslim communities, faith-based movements, and Sufi brotherhoods. They rely on the upper- and middle-class segments of society. These communities, movements, and businesspeople who are associated with them head several companies, schools, Islamic charities, hospitals, magazines, newspapers, radio and TV stations, and so on. They run many other types of NGOs, in which citizens exert pressure in order to maintain their rights and liberties. Their activities range from fighting poverty to human rights advocacy, from social cohesion to interreligious and intercultural dialogue. In short, Islamic civil society is not only religious but also political, social, and cultural—and economically active in Dutch society. 11

Islamic civil society in the Netherlands has four general characteristics: voluntariness, responsibility, solidarity, and generosity (Çelik, 2010). First, Islamic civil society is constituted by voluntary involvement in associations, foundations, and social activities. Second, civil society organizations initiated by Muslim individuals allow them to translate their social and community responsibility into activities and projects. This sense of social responsibility contributes to another characteristic of Islamic civil society—the solidarity of Muslim citizens as regards support of civil initiatives. This solidarity manifests itself particularly in terms of participation in religious gatherings, religious associations, educational initiatives, and cultural and charitable activities. Philanthropic involvement is the fourth important characteristic. Muslims are inclined to give generously. Their custom is to give money to charity and for social ends when needed, such as educational and health facilities, research institutes, even the lighting of streets. For Muslims, the zakat (religious endowment), for example, is an important annual religious and social obligation to cede a part of their equity in support of vulnerable groups and needy people—Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Islamic organizations are in general financially supported by individual citizens or ethnic entrepreneurs.

Muslim civil society organizations mainly rely on volunteers, as their activities can often only be implemented by voluntary efforts, given the lack of financial resources to employ professionals. As noted above, religion is a motivating factor for volunteering and being involved in social projects. It is, therefore, an important binder for voluntary associations. With the support of volunteers, faith-based organizations can make a significant contribution to the social development of society. The social return on people’s voluntary efforts through mosques and affiliated organizations is manifold. This argument follows what Putnam (2000) has referred to as “bridging” activity, which compels religiously motivated individuals to become active in circles beyond their own religious ones.
It is important to note that Islamic civil society organizations engage in non-religious activities in the social, economic, and political arenas. They are increasingly learning how to position themselves as lobbyists for their rights—for example, criticizing new policy on religion-related issues such as ritual slaughter or a ban on wearing a headscarf in specific professions. Not only do the volunteers fulfil key supporting tasks in civil society organizations, but in a roundabout way this saves a lot of money for municipalities, and the charitable efforts of numerous volunteers are beneficial to their inhabitants (Davelaar & van den Toorn, 2011).

**Christian and Islamic Civil Society in Secularized Dutch Society**

Using the three subthemes mentioned in the Introduction (interaction with and between groups; experiences of working with a religious organization in civil society; and financial cooperation with local authorities), this section elaborates on the experiences of respondents, focusing on four religious identity organizations.

**Interaction with and between Groups**

The present four case studies cover two Christian-inspired and two Islamic-inspired organizations. The Present Foundation is a Christian community organization, which strives to motivate people to take care of each other. IKV Pax Christi is a peace organization with a Christian background. Ettaouhid, a Moroccan Islamic organization, is committed to activating the Islamic community in the Netherlands. Islam and Dialogue is a Turkish organization with an Islamic foundation, which aims to stimulate interfaith dialogue between Muslims and those of other religions.

The four organizations arrange a wide variety of activities. The two Christian organizations are mainly—but not exclusively—active within Christian circles. IKV Pax Christi also operates internationally in Islamic countries. During their annual Peace Week in the Netherlands, their older traditional Christian supporters in particular are invited to participate. Present encourages its grassroots to help fellow citizens in need of advice and assistance. It offers practical one-day projects to groups of volunteers—for example, painting the house of a single mother with a limited social network. Many projects are delivered by social workers. The volunteers for Present are Christian, but they also help needy Muslims, who are often amazed by such help in a country where Islam is frequently questioned (Setz, 2011, pp. 154–163).

Almost all activities of Islam and Dialogue have a mixed Turkish and Dutch audience consisting of Muslims in particular and Christians. They promote mutual knowledge of Islam and Christianity by organizing activities such as lectures, theme evenings, and training in interfaith dialogue skills—when possible together with Christian organizations. Through Islamic festivals, Islam and Dialogue organizes accessible and cross-religious activities. Despite a wide Islamic approach, Moroccan Ettaouhid focuses mainly on the Moroccan community in the Netherlands. They organize activities for Muslims to help them develop themselves—for example, with integration courses, sewing classes for women, and educational guidance for disadvantaged youth. Both Islamic organizations participate in the Dutch National Day of Dialogue and various interfaith platforms.
Regardless of their religion, both Christian and Islamic organizations operate in cooperation with external partners and are committed to different target groups, but the Islamic foundations act more often and more explicitly from an interfaith perspective than the Christian organizations (Alasag, 2011, pp. 146–153; Lachhab, 2011, pp. 125–132; Ruigrok, 2011, pp. 133–145; Setz, 2011, pp. 154–163). One explanation for this fact is that for Muslims, as a minority in the population, it is more important to have good cooperation with outsiders.

Experiences of Working with a Religious Identity

According to Schnabel (2011), the Director of the Netherlands Institute for Social Research, believers are traditionally the cornerstone of civil society. Generally, believers are growing older, except for members of the new immigrant churches and mosques. This is confirmed by the Christian Present Foundation, which noted that in the structure of pillarization, people took much more care of each other. Christian communities no longer have a central role, but with individualization and the forthcoming economic cuts in welfare, there is still an important task for them—not to join forces, but to motivate others. This is consistent with the aforementioned recent WMO, in which the government gives more space to religious organizations to interact in non-religious activities in order to help people solve their social problems. From this perspective, the growing multiculturalism presents opportunities in society to religious organizations.

Both Christian and Muslim organizations and politicians invoke their religious background as inspiration for the work they perform. They quote virtues and duties mentioned in the Qur’an and the Bible as a base from which they want to help their fellow citizens. At the same time, however, they realize that religion does not have the monopoly on inspiration. According to Present, a shared goal can form an intrinsic motivation to help—whether it is religious, humanist, or atheist in origin. Alaattin Erdal, a local Muslim politician from a Christian party, sees religious civil society as a start for dialogue, tolerance, and cooperation. Religious writings and Muslim philosophers and poets have encouraged him to be a successful Muslim role model for new generations. Ettaouhid maintains that volunteering is the highest form of Islamic faith, as it means putting faith into action (Lachhab, 2011, pp. 125–132).

Christian and Muslim organizations alike want to use their network to get through to believers who are otherwise difficult to reach. This strength is recognized by the local politicians. Present calculated that if all the churchgoers committed themselves to voluntary activities for just one day a year, they would achieve as much work as many full-time professionals. Likewise, Ettaouhid and Islam and Dialogue say that their knowledge about the specific religious and cultural problems of Muslim immigrants is very useful.

With regard to IKV Pax Christi, its Christian name and identity allow it to join other churches, religious groups, and organizations internationally. It gives—even in Muslim countries—recognition of a shared connection with the values of ‘the Book’ but, owing to increasing global tensions, this advantage is becoming less effective (Ruigrok, 2011, pp. 133–145). Islam and Dialogue is often asked for because it has ‘Islam’ in its name. According to the respondents, this Islamic identity opens doors to schools, hospitals, and community centres.

Besides the advantages of a religious identity, the respondents also mentioned some disadvantages. IKV Pax Christi noted that the Netherlands is highly secularized. A significant
number of its own staff no longer works on the basis of a Christian commitment. Although having a religious motive is not questioned internationally, this is not the case in the Netherlands. IKV Pax Christi sees that the moral position of churches in modern society is decreasing, and this has an effect on its work. Their Christian name evokes disgust and trepidation as well as attraction.

Islam and Dialogue has had a similar experience. An Islamic identity opens doors, but also regularly raises questions. In the current political and social climate, Islamic organizations are often viewed with suspicion. In addition, this identity is sometimes detrimental to fundraising—though the drawback is not so much related to Islamic identity as to religious identity in general. Local politicians, especially the Liberal councillors Wouter Kolff and Eric van der Burg, focus on the separation between church and state in the Netherlands. Although they recognize the value that religious organizations can have for society, they are wary about cooperating with a religious organization, and non-religious organizations have an advantage in this context.

Two former members of the Dutch Parliament, Femke Halsema of the GreenLeft Party and André Roupvoet of the Christian Union Party, have stressed the importance of freedom of choice in the exercise of religion. Halsema sees it as a government task to prevent the coercion of conscience. According to Halsema, as long as people choose to live by certain religious rules, such as wearing a headscarf, it is their civil right. If, however, family, community, or social organizations use force to make them comply, the government has the obligation to protect women and girls. In contrast, the Orthodox Protestant Roupvoet is very reticent regarding the role of the government in intervening in such cases. He distinguishes between politics and the state. A political party may be religious or non-religious, but the state should be neutral.

In sum, despite the few minor disadvantages of a religious name, the respondents see their faith in general as a great advantage—providing direction, inspiration, and collaboration. In politics, views differ about whether the government should act in the case of abuse.

Financial Cooperation with Local Authorities

All the aldermen who were interviewed indicated that the separation between church and state plays a role in their decisions and policies concerning organizations with a religious background. Regarding this, it is important to note that the cooperation with religious organizations and the funding of those organizations are different things.

Four of the five local politicians who are aldermen from different political parties (Alaattin Erdal, Korrie Louwes, Eric van der Burg, Wouter Kolff) indicated that civil society has an important role in the implementation of the WMO by helping hard-to-reach members of society. They appreciated the contribution of religious organizations, churches, and mosques—which helped to increase participation and which function as a safety net for vulnerable groups. Nevertheless, the condition for cooperation with the municipality is that those activities are non-religious.

All four organizations stated that cooperation with local authorities was very important if they were to coordinate and carry out their activities properly. Through the WMO, the government has a ‘directing role’. Present stated that, like a good referee, a good director is not visible, but crucial for the success of the players. The sociologist Zijderveld (2011) suggested that civil society gives citizens influence and power—for example, through
inter-religious councils. According to him, this shared power can irritate politicians, who prefer to keep hold of the reins.

The municipalities have no clear policy for funding faith-based organizations. The aldermen saw possibilities, provided the case is about non-religious activities. Compared with the others, Kolff and Van der Burg, both from the VVD Liberal Party, were less enthusiastic about funding such organizations. They are reluctant to provide any subsidies at all. They think cooperation in undertaking social activities in general and of a neutral nature might be possible, but funding these might put the municipalities on a slippery slope. All other aldermen—Social Democratic (Baâdoud, PvdA), Christian Democratic (Erdal, CDA), and Social Liberal (Louwes, D66)—on the whole saw advantages of cooperation with civil society. Social Liberal Korrie Louwes (D66) wanted to subsidize religious organizations, specifically as a confirmation of the government’s acknowledgement of the diversity of society. She recognized the value of such diversity in which religion can work as a connecting element, instead of being a breakpoint.

Research by the Verwey Jonker Institute (Davelaar, 2011; Davelaar & van Waesberghe, 2010) confirmed what was stated above by the aldermen. According to Maarten Davelaar, about half of the 59 Dutch municipalities that were surveyed provided subsidies to religious organizations. Most of the subsidy went to ‘traditional’ Christian organizations. Islamic and Hindu organizations and immigrant churches were only subsidized by a few municipalities, generally just for small amounts, and were not funded for structural repairs. According to Davelaar (2011), there is much local colour in the vision of municipalities. There is little on paper and often decisions are not policy-driven but are based on the particular situation. Pragmatism is a key driver: the work must be done, and if there is no ‘neutral’ organization, municipalities will choose a religious organization. There are no arbitrary solutions, however, but general and specific rules for obtaining subsidies. The requirements have become tougher concerning the quality of grant applications, transparency, and accountability. No allowance is made for migrant organizations which do not really know how to apply for funds (Davelaar, 2011).

In the four case study organizations, government funding creates a dilemma. IKV Pax Christi indicates that since the government is a major funder, its input with respect to content and decision-making is also substantial. This is the main reason why Ettaouhid works completely without subsidies. In contrast, Islam and Dialogue has decided to professionalize its staff to a certain extent, although it wonders whether the improvement in quality outweighs the loss of flexibility (Alasag, 2011, pp. 146–153). Increasing fixed costs are at the expense of time and money in terms of the core business: making connections between people.

It can briefly be said that local politicians generally see opportunities to collaborate with religious organizations and to support their non-religious, social activities. However, the policy in this area is inconsistent and often very ad hoc. The researched organizations would like to cooperate with municipalities, even though such collaboration also has disadvantages in the form of requirements and restrictions.

**Conclusion and Discussion**

This article provides an outline of Christian and Islamic engagement in modern Dutch society and feeds the open debate about this subject. The following are some general conclusions.
The Netherlands score high among European countries for voluntary participation, for religious as well as non-religious participation. Literature analysis, statistics, and the case studies endorse the finding that religiously inspired people and their organizations are more socially committed—for example, as volunteers in voluntary organizations. Putnam and Campbell (2010) show that the intrinsic motivation of churchgoers is driven more by the altruistic values they are taught through their religion than by the fact that they are believers (see also SCP, 2011). Most of our statistical information about volunteers is derived from research about Christians; we have fewer statistics about Muslims. Nevertheless, the information indicates that the involvement of church members in voluntary work is mainly owed to the frequency of church attendance and the values which believers internalize; it is to be expected that the same will apply to believing Muslims. Further statistical research is needed, but this conclusion is confirmed by the four case studies and the other interviews with academics and local politicians. Members of both Christian and Muslim organizations are motivated to help other people because of their religious beliefs, such as the importance of volunteer engagement, responsibility, solidarity, and generosity, values which are mentioned in the Bible and the Qur’an. In their cooperation with social actors, business people, government agencies, and municipalities they see mainly positive consequences of being a faith-inspired organization. Islamic communities in the Netherlands—similarly to other European countries—mobilize their followers to serve the common good by adopting an intermediary role between state and citizens, negotiating between the social and religious needs of Muslims and the socio-economic, legal, and political context of the country (Yükleyen, 2012).

Besides many formally structured civil society organizations, there are a number of other social structures and relationships within Islamic Dutch civil society. These broadly oriented movements operate independently. For example, there is the Hizmet or Gülen Movement—a large religious-inspired social movement of Turkish origin, in which citizens and organizations participate in a wide variety of educational and socio-cultural activities. They organize themselves under the umbrella organization UmNed (www.umned.nl). This movement does not run or build mosques, in contrast to the Turkish Milli Görüş and Diyanet (Çelik, 2010, 2011; Çelik & Alan, 2012). Another Islamic-inspired movement is the Islamic Centre Netherlands (SICN), also known as the Movement of the Süleymanlis. The SICN-affiliated institutions are mainly focused on the empowerment and participation of their grassroots. They often organize Qur’an schools for young people and have their own mosques in the Netherlands (Canatan, Popovic, & Edinga, 2005). Similar structures exist within other ethnic-religious groups in the Netherlands as well.

In short, there is a broad range of active Islamic-inspired organizations, platforms, and social movements in the Netherlands. They organize educational, cultural, social, and religious projects and services. Their projects and services do not always have a religious approach or message, and can occasionally be characterized as secular initiatives. As far as these organizations are concerned, religion is particularly present in the personal lives of the participants and supporters of such civil society organizations and movements.

Civil society as a social sphere is constantly subjected to change. Contacts within these organizations are more volatile, and people often commit themselves less formally to a movement or an organization than by becoming members. The challenge for civil society organizations is to adapt their approach, to find new volunteers, and to make sure they commit themselves in the long term.
Another development is the increasing depillarization and secularization combined with policies such as the WMO, which requires more of citizens and social organizations in terms of participating in solving social problems. Whereas the traditional Christian civil society is becoming smaller, there is a significant role for new religious groups, in which religion often has a stronger role in members’ everyday life. The best opportunities are available to new groups in the Netherlands that are able to join the existing institutional frameworks; for example, the University of Humanist Studies and the Buddhist Public Broadcasting Association, as well as Islamic educational institutions such as the Islamic University Rotterdam and Islamic-oriented primary and secondary schools. Pillarization cannot function as a model for social order any longer, but for funding and acknowledgement the model is still applicable. This article confirms Schnabel’s observation (2011) that it still answers the need to express one’s own ideological identity in the form of publicly financed social services.

The four case studies about the Christian Present Foundation, IKV Pax Christi, the Ettaouhid, and Islam and Dialogue show they are active in bonding, bridging, and linking. They constitute a meeting-point for their own community, and also work to increase the emancipation and participation of their supporters. Owing to depillarization, there is decreasing bonding within the Christian communities. At the same time, the Islamic community is beginning to develop this bonding more and more, albeit within ethnic and religious boundaries.

In addition, the religious-based organizations are working increasingly in a more ecumenical manner, to help people of different religions and develop interreligious cooperation. The Islamic organizations are more active in this context, perhaps because of their minority position. This outcome rebuts the assumption that religious organizations often have an inward, contemplative attitude towards their own group and that they operate very little outside their own community. Bridging gaps, however, not only depends on religious affiliations. The acknowledgements of non-religious associations and the government are also important. Are they both open to faith-based activities and to cooperation with religious organizations?

To a certain extent, this is the case. Local and national governments have various interfaith councils, wherein Islamic organizations participate, and can represent and influence the policies concerning the interests of their group. To take an active part in Dutch civil society, a number of Islamic organizations of various ethnic backgrounds united to form the Contact Committee Muslims and Government or CMO (www.cmoweb.nl). The CMO is the official consultative body of Dutch Muslim organizations. In addition to the CMO, there are also regional platforms in the Netherlands, such as SPIOR (Foundation Platform Islamic Organizations Rijnmond), with which all kinds of Islamic organizations are connected. The CMO and SPIOR are the only organizations in the Netherlands which teach Islam in schools. Children in the Netherlands have the right to religious education by law. There are several other Islamic organizations or interest groups as well, divided on ethnic and religious lines (Sunni and Shia Islam) (Celik, 2010; Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011).

The four organizations discussed in this article are willing to cooperate with the government because they can develop vertical cooperative relations (linking), which give civil society some influence on policy. Matching financial and practical government obligations with the ideologies of civil society organizations can, however, be difficult. Despite local differences and unclear policies, municipalities are generally aware of the limitations of
subsidies so they try to act carefully within the adjusted frameworks. At the same time, the priority is to achieve local goals. Roughly half of the 59 Dutch municipalities studied by the Verwey Jonker Institute (Davelaar, 2011; Davelaar & van Waesbergh, 2010) consider the social impact of subsidies to be more important than the possible violation of the separation of church and state.

The separation of church and state is the result of a liberal stance in the Netherlands and makes sure the state does not materially interfere with the religious belief of citizens, and vice versa. This concept is not the same as a separation between religion and politics. Political parties can represent the various religious and idealistic beliefs, as long as the state itself is neutral. This creates opportunities for cooperation and financing between municipalities and religious organizations. Religious organizations’ applications are not ruled out in advance, provided their activities are non-religious. In this context, municipalities should not make distinctions between religions. Public opinion, however, suggests such a distinction is frequently made.

There is a double standard in attitudes towards religious engagement in civil society. Religiously motivated people have a score well above the average as active volunteers (including non-religious voluntary work), because religion can motivate people to work selflessly. Religious and religion-based organizations also have appropriate networks. There is still concern, however, about the improper use of the—mostly modest—social grants for religious purposes and conversion.

Finally, there is no one formula to enhance, refine, or improve public opinion about religious issues. Local authorities should discuss these religious themes more in the public arena, so it is clear what is permitted and what is not.

Notes

1. Religious identity organizations are organizations that work from a religious inspiration. The activities do not always have to be linked to religion but can also serve the public interest.
2. The interviewees were separated into three categories: local politicians, representatives of fieldwork organizations, and academics. In the case of politicians and representatives of the fieldwork organizations, personal religious belief was included. See Table A1 in Appendix 1.
3. The WMO was introduced on 1 January 2007. It is a comprehensive law giving the municipalities responsibilities in nine fields for protecting and supporting vulnerable civil groups, increasing self-reliance, and promoting participation.
4. In other international surveys, the Netherlands is also in the European top 20 countries but behind the Scandinavian countries (Dekker, 2009). The reason for this extremely high score is not clear.
5. Results of volunteer work are the same as the results of the European Social Survey 2002/2003 (Dekker & de Hart, 2006).
6. Pillarization (verzuiling in Dutch) is the politico-denominational segregation of Dutch society. The Dutch society was (and in some areas, still is) ‘vertically’ divided into several segments or ‘pillars’ (zuilen) according to different religions or ideologies. These pillars all had their own social institutions: their own newspapers, publishers, broadcasting organizations, political parties, trade unions, banks, schools, hospitals, universities, scouting organizations, and sport clubs. Some companies even hired only members of specific religions or ideologies. This led to a situation where many people had no personal contact with people from another pillar.
7. The data are derived from the Time Use Survey of SCP for 1975–2005 (based on analysis of people’s diaries).
8. This is a huge part, but it corresponds with a more detailed survey of Rotterdam in which half of the frequent churchgoers participated as volunteers (Castillo Guerra, Glashouwer, & Kregting, 2008).
9. The Protestant Church is the largest Protestant Christian denomination in the Netherlands. With congregations of up to 1700 and a membership of some 1.8 million (or 10.8% of the Dutch population in 2010),
it is the second largest church in the Netherlands after the Roman Catholic Church. It was founded on 1 May 2004 with the merger of the Dutch Reformed Church, the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Statistic Annual Report 2010 of Protestant Church in the Netherlands, www.pkn.nl).


11. Numerous organizations and movements inspired by religion are active in society, but because of the nature of their activities and projects, not all of them can be qualified as ‘religious’. There is a clear distinction between being religious and the services and projects of an organization in the public domain.

12. Interviews with representatives of four civil society organizations: Alper Alasag, Fatima Zahra Lachhab, Edwin Ruigrok, and Rudolf Setz. See Table A1 in Appendix 1 for details.

13. These two respondents were members of the Dutch Parliament at the time of our study. Femke Halsema was the leader of the Green Party, and André Rouvoet was the leader of the Christian Union Party.

14. Aldermen is used in this article for both sexes.

15. These four local politicians were aldermen and representatives of different political parties: Alaattin Erdal (Muslim; district vice-chairman Rotterdam Charlois for the Christian Democratic Party, CDA); Korrie Louwes (secular; alderwoman in Rotterdam for the Social-Liberal Party, D66); Eric van der Burg (secular; alderman Amsterdam for the VVD Liberal Party); Wouter Kolff (secular; then alderman in Nieuwegein for the VVD Liberal Party, now the mayor of Venendaal).

16. Amongst them are the Federation of Muslim Organizations in the Netherlands (FOMON), Islamic Council Netherlands (IRN), Council of Mosques in the Netherlands (NMR), Contact Group Islam (CGI), Cooperating Muslim Aid Organizations (SMHO), Shiite Umbrella Association (OSV), and the Federation of Islamic Organizations in the Netherlands (FION).

References


Setz, R. (2011) Beginnen bij de samenleving verandert jezelf [Starting at the society is changing yourself], in: P. Dekker, G. Çelik & I. Creemers (Eds) Breakpoint of Bindmiddel: Religious engagement in de civil...
van Houten, M. (2010) Wij willen nog veel helpen maar ons niet vastleggen [We want to help a lot but do not capture]. Trouw (De diepeing), 4 November.


Appendix 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent group</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Religious affiliation</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Local) politicians</td>
<td>Achmed Baâoud</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>District chairman Amsterdam New-West for the Labour Party PvdA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eric van der Burg</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Alderman Amsterdam for the Liberal Party VVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alaattin Erdal</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>District vice-chairman Rotterdam Charlois for the Christian-Democratic Party CDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Femke Halsema</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Member of parliament for the progressive secular Green Party GroenLinks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wouter Kolff</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Alderman in Nieuwegein for the Liberal Party VVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korrie Louwes</td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Alderman in Rotterdam for the Social-Liberal Party D66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society organizations</td>
<td>André Rouvoet</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Member of parliament for the Christian Party ChristenUnie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alper Alasag</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Director of the Turkish-Islamic Islam en Dialoog Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fatima Zahra Lachhab</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Volunteer project manager at the Moroccan-Islamic Ettaouhid Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edwin Ruigrok</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Manager of Christian identity at the Christian peace organization IKV Pax Christi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rudolf Setz</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Director of the Christian community work organization Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>Maarten Davelaar</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Social researcher at Verwey Jonker Institute Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paul Dekker</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Professor of Civil Society at Tilburg University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paul Schnabel</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Director of the Netherlands Institute for Social Research and distinguished professor at Utrecht University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anton Zijderveld</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Professor Emeritus of Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>