BACHELOR THESIS

Challenges and Key Principles
How to Improve
Development Cooperation and Increase Aid Effectiveness

A Case Study on the Performance of
Germany, France and the United Kingdom

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The Hague, 29 May 2012

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Declaration

I hereby confirm that this is my own work and that all sources used have been fully acknowledged and referenced in the prescribed manner.

Alix Reichenecker

The Hague, 29 May 2012

Place, Date, Signature
Abstract

The objective of this thesis was to research how development cooperation among donors and recipients could be improved so as to increase the effectiveness of aid and to advance the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. To this end, the author chose to make inquiries as to which challenges impede development cooperation and which key principles are essential for an improved cooperation. Moreover, the performance of donors in development cooperation was investigated.

On the basis of the research questions, the author decided to follow a qualitative approach. Next to a detailed review of relevant secondary data, the findings were based on primary data gathered through four semi-structured interviews with experts and case studies of three European donors: Germany, France and the United Kingdom.

The research showed, that a number of challenges constitute obstacles to improve development cooperation. These include the economic crisis, which resulted in the decrease of Official Development Assistance (ODA); the broader development agenda and the nexus between development and security as well as the broader donor landscape. The biggest hurdle however remains the national interests by which development cooperation still seems to be influenced for a big part. As for the key principles ownership and division of labour emerged as the most important ones, confirming the principles agreed upon on the Global and European level. Adding value to the thesis the decision was made to extend the research and assess three European donors on their performance in a selected number of points important for improving development cooperation. The result was mixed. While all donors seem to have made first steps in the right direction much remains to be done. Especially Germany and France need to improve their performance in key areas such as ODA disbursement as percentage of GNI and geographic concentration, whereas the United Kingdom should continue on its proactive approach but focus more on a better partnership with recipient countries.

All in all, it can be said that in the past years many initiatives have been launched with a good approach to improve development cooperation. Hence, it is not a question of formulating new declarations or code of conducts. Against the backdrop of the many challenges, it is instead important that what has been agreed upon is implemented and action follow words. As a conclusion to the thesis the author gives a set of recommendations as to how development cooperation can be improved.

Key Words: Development Cooperation, Aid Effectiveness, Coordination, Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation, Division of Labour and Complementarity.
# Table of Contents

Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... II

List of Graphs and Tables ........................................................................................................ V

List of Acronyms ........................................................................................................................ VI

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 2

2. Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 6
   2.1. The Choice of Method .................................................................................................................. 6
   2.2. Data Collection ............................................................................................................................... 7
   2.3. Interviews ........................................................................................................................................ 7
      2.3.1. The Interviewees ................................................................................................................................... 8
   2.4. Case Studies .................................................................................................................................... 9
      2.4.1. Selection of the Principles .............................................................................................................. 10

3. Literature Review ................................................................................................................ 11
   3.1. Major Challenges of Development Cooperation .............................................................. 11
      3.1.1. Economic Crisis, ODA & CPA ......................................................................................................... 11
      3.1.2. The Security Development Nexus ............................................................................................ 14
      3.1.3. ...and the Issue of National Interests .......................................................................................... 14
   3.2. Ways to Increase Aid Effectiveness and Improve Development Cooperation...... 15
      3.2.1. Ownership & Alignment .................................................................................................................. 15
      3.2.2. Harmonisation: Coordination through Division of Labour to Increase Complementarity ........................................................................................................................................... 16
   3.3. The Implications of Uncoordinated Action ....................................................................... 16
      3.3.1. Donor Proliferation, Aid Fragmentation & Aid Orphans ................................................... 17
   3.4. Summary ........................................................................................................................................ 18

4. Findings ................................................................................................................................... 19
   4.1. Interviews ...................................................................................................................................... 19
   4.1.2. Findings of the Interviews ................................................................................................... 20
   4.2. Case Studies .................................................................................................................................. 23
      4.2.1. Overview of the Findings ........................................................................................................ 25
      4.2.2. Findings Case Studies: Germany, France & United Kingdom ........................................... 27
   4.3. Summary ........................................................................................................................................ 30
      4.3.1. Interviews ............................................................................................................................................. 30
      4.3.2. Case Studies .......................................................................................................................................... 30

The Hague School of European Studies
5. Discussion ........................................................................................................................................ 31

5.1. What Impedes Development Cooperation? ............................................................................. 31
  5.1.1. National Interest .................................................................................................................. 31
  5.1.2. Broader Donor Landscape ................................................................................................. 32
  5.1.3. Other Challenges: Decreasing ODA & Security-Development Nexus ......................... 33

5.2. What are the Key Principles for Improved Development Cooperation? .................. 34
  5.2.1. Coordination ..................................................................................................................... 34
  5.2.2. Ownership ....................................................................................................................... 34
  5.2.3. Division of Labour .......................................................................................................... 35

5.3. How well are donors performing? ....................................................................................... 35
  5.3.1. Ownership & Alignment ................................................................................................. 35
  5.3.2. Harmonisation: Division of Labour .................................................................................. 36
  5.3.3. Geographic Concentration .............................................................................................. 36
  5.3.4. ODA Level ....................................................................................................................... 36
  5.3.5. Sector Concentration .................................................................................................... 37
  5.3.6. Basing Sectors on Comparative Advantages (Focal Areas) of Donors ...................... 37
  5.3.7. Implementing Ownership & Alignment ........................................................................ 37

5.4. Summary .................................................................................................................................... 38

6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 39

Concluding Summary ...................................................................................................................... 39

Main Findings .................................................................................................................................. 40
  Challenges Impeding Development Cooperation .................................................................... 40
  Key Principles for Improving Development Cooperation ..................................................... 40
  The Performance of Donors ....................................................................................................... 40

Recommendations .......................................................................................................................... 41

Limitations ........................................................................................................................................ 42

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 42

Glossary .......................................................................................................................................... 43

References ....................................................................................................................................... 45

References for the Case Studies ................................................................................................. 48

Appendix I – Interview Jost Kadel .................................................................................... 50
Appendix II – Interview Monika Hoegen ................................................................................ 51
Appendix III – Interview Guido Ashoff ............................................................................... 52
Appendix IV – Interview Mark Furness ............................................................................. 53
List of Graphs and Tables

Figure 1: The Millennium Development Goals .......................................................... 2
Figure 2: The 5 Paris Declaration Principles ............................................................... 2
Figure 3: The Guiding Principles of the EU Code of Conduct ................................... 2
Figure 4: The 3 types of Complementarity ................................................................. 3
Figure 5: Article 208 & 210, Treaty of Lisbon ............................................................ 3
Figure 6: Research Questions ..................................................................................... 6
Figure 7: The Interviewees ......................................................................................... 8
Figure 8: Example In-Text Citation .......................................................................... 8
Figure 9: The Principles for the Case Studies ........................................................... 9
Figure 10: Gap 2011 ODA level and 2015 target ....................................................... 11
Figure 11: Public Opinion on ODA Level ................................................................ 12
Figure 12: High Programmable Aid Share ............................................................... 13
Figure 13: Donor Proliferation ............................................................................... 17
Figure 14: Aid Fragmentation .................................................................................. 17
Figure 15: Research Methods for Sub Questions .................................................... 19
Figure 16: Overview Interviewees ........................................................................... 19
Figure 17: Themes Interviews .................................................................................. 19
Figure 18: Principles for Case Studies .................................................................... 24
Figure 19: Research Questions ............................................................................... 31
Figure 20: Research Questions ............................................................................... 39
List of Acronyms

AFD – Agence française du développement
BMZ – Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung
BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CoC – Code of Conduct
CPA – Country Programmable Aid
CSO – Civil Society Organisation
DFID – Department for International Development
DoL – Division of Labour
EC – European Commission
ECJ – European Court of Justice
EEAS – European External Action Service
EU – European Union
GDI – German Development Institute
GNI – Gross National Income
HLF – High Level Forum
LDC – Least Developed Country
LIC – Low Income Country
MS – Member State
MDG – Millennium Development Goal
MIC – Middle Income Country
NGO – Non-governmental Organisation
NMS – New Member States
ODI – Overseas Development Institute
OEDC – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ODA – Official Development Assistance
PCD – Policy Coherence for Development
PD – Paris Declaration
PFD – Partnership Framework Document
PRS – Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SDC – Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
UNECE – United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UK – United Kingdom
1. Introduction

Since the turn of the Millennium all the world’s countries and leading development institutions are following eight common goals, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which they agreed to reach by 2015. Following the agreement on the MDGs, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has been organising High Level Fora (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness on a regular basis. Those forums brought together key actors of development cooperation giving them the possibility to review developments of the past years and discuss ways to improve aid effectiveness and advance the implementation of the MDGs. The second HLF was held in 2005 in Paris, France and was concluded with the signing of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

The Declaration was signed by donors, recipients and civil society organisations and lists five principles to increase aid effectiveness.

In the EU, discussions on how to improve aid effectiveness on the European level have been going on some time prior to the second HLF. In 2000, the European Community’s Development Policy puts an emphasis on complementarity between the Union’s and the Member States’ development policies through division of labour. In 2006, about a year after the High Level Forum in Paris, the European Consensus on Development was published, representing a cornerstone for development cooperation as for

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1 The Web site to the UN Millennium Development Goals can be found here: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
2 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness can be consulted here: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf
4 The European Consensus on Development can be found here: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/european_consensus_2005_en.pdf
the “first time ever, the Council, the Parliament and the Commission agreed on a set of common values, principles and objectives for the EU’s development policy” (European Commission, 2007, p. 3). Finally, in 2007, the Council of the European Union and representatives of the Governments of the Member States adopted the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy. Although the Code is of voluntary nature it presents a milestone for improving development cooperation in the EU through division of labour. The Code of Conduct (CoC) sets out eleven guiding principles to which the EU donors should commit to, in order to strengthen complementarity through division of labour. Moreover the Code defines three forms of complementarity:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complementarity</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-country</td>
<td>How many donors are active in a particular country and in which sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-country</td>
<td>Donors should distribute aid ‘equally’, avoiding concentration on ‘darling’ countries and negligence of ‘orphan’ countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-sector</td>
<td>Based on strengths and comparative advantages donors concentrate on certain sectors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: The 3 types of Complementarity

In 2009, after years of discussions, the Lisbon Treaty is finally ratified in 2009. Beside many institutional changes the Treaty also emphasizes the shared competence in development cooperation between the Union and the Member States and stresses the importance of aid effectiveness and complementarity.

Article 208, Lisbon Treaty: Shared Competence

“1. Union policy in the field of development cooperation, shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action. The Union’s development cooperation policy and that of the Member States shall complement and reinforce each other.”

Article 210, Lisbon Treaty: Complementarity and Efficiency through Coordination

“1. In order to promote the complementarity and efficiency of their action, the Union and the MS shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid programmes, including in international organisations and during international conferences. They may undertake joint action. MS shall contribute if necessary to the implementation of Union aid programmes.”

Figure 5: Article 208 & 210, Treaty of Lisbon

Despite the fact, that not all the initiatives have been listed above, it becomes evident that much has been done to increase aid effectiveness as to reach the Millennium Development Goals. Nevertheless, many challenges still impede the smooth implementation of the initiatives such as the Paris Declaration and the EU Code of Conduct, which are regarded as the two most central initiatives on this matter. For one thing, donors continue being too eager to secure their visibility, sphere of influence and national interests. Moreover, operational challenges such as differing

5 The EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy can be found here: http://www.dev-practitioners.eu/fileadmin/Redaktion/Documents/Reference_Documents/EU_Code_of_Conduct.pdf
programming cycles impede an effective division of labour. In 2012, donors are also faced with new challenges. The last decade has seen an immense increase of new donors beyond as well as within the EU. Apart from the twelve New Member States, several other donors have emerged on the scene such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as well as numerous NGOs and private donors. Furthermore, the current financial crisis puts many donors behind their commitments made in 2002 in Monterrey to increase the level of ODA.

Against this background, the question emerges as to how development cooperation can be improved to increase the effectiveness of aid. As the EU Code of Conduct and the Paris Declaration are based on the wealth of experience, the author will take the central principles the two define as essential for improved development cooperation at face value. Based on those principles the author will research where ameliorations can be made to improve development cooperation and eventually increase aid effectiveness. In order to find an answer to this question, a number of sub questions need to be considered, such as: what are the issues surrounding and impeding development cooperation; what are the key principles for improved development cooperation and how are donors performing with respect to a set of central aspects for development cooperation.

A priori the most central concepts and terms used throughout the thesis must be clearly defined and explained as to ensure comprehension of this complex topic. The first three principles of the Paris Declaration: ownership, alignment and harmonisation form the basis for improved development cooperation and eventually more effective aid. The Paris Declaration defines ownership as “partner countries exercis[ing] effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions” (OECD, 2005, p.3). Basically, this means, that partner countries, the recipients of aid, are in the driving seat and lead the development cooperation process. Alignment is when “donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures” (Ibid, p.4). Harmonisation refers to when “donors’ actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively effective” (Ibid, p.6). Complementarity and division of labour are part of a harmonised approach. Wehmeier (2000) defines complementarity as two or more things that are different but together form a useful or attractive combination of skills, qualities or physical features” (p.246 -247). In terms of development cooperation this would mean that by coordinating the development policies of the different donors it would form an “attractive combination of skills and qualities” (Ibid). Reaching complementarity requires division of labour. The term itself is quite straightforward. The aim of division of labour is to increase effectiveness through burden sharing, meaning that instead of all working on the same country or sector and neglecting others, everyone works together, specialising in a certain field of work ensuring that in the end all donors complement each other and no country or sector is disregarded. The term
development cooperation can be a little confusing. The author uses it to refer to the cooperation among donors as well as between donors and partners. Generally, development cooperation refers to how different actors work together to improve the development of partner countries. Whether the author refers to the cooperation between donors, between donors and partners or among all actors will become evident from the context. If not, the author will express it in such a way as that the meaning is clear. Finally, the term aid effectiveness will be used throughout the text. When using this term the author refers to as to how effective the aid given by donors is in improving development in a partner country. The development to be reached is the fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals. These seven terms, the three principles of the Paris Declaration (ownership, alignment and harmonisation) together with the terms complementarity, division of labour, development cooperation and aid effectiveness, are the most essential for comprehending the topic at hand. In case new terms and concepts should emerge, the author will define them directly. All definitions provided can however be looked up at any time in the Glossary.

After this introduction, which constitutes the first chapter, the thesis is structured around another six chapters. In the second part, the choice of the research method and the selected types of data collection and how they are going to be analysed will be justified in the ‘Methodology’ chapter. Thirdly, based on the newest studies and academic publications the major challenges of development cooperation, the ways to improve development cooperation and the implications of uncoordinated action will be discussed in the ‘Literature Review’. Fourthly, the author will present the outcomes of the expert interviews conducted and the case studies done on Germany, France and the United Kingdom in the ‘Findings’ chapter. In the fifth part, the ‘Discussion’, the author will link the findings and the literature review and answer the research questions. Finally, in the ‘Conclusion’ a summary of the key findings will be provided and recommendations for the future will be made.
2. Methodology

Prior to conducting research the researcher is confronted with a set of choices as to which methodological approach is the most suitable for the thesis. The variety of methods ranges from deductive and inductive approaches to qualitative and quantitative methods. Although this seems like a reasonable set of options, there are a series of qualitative and quantitative designs. While qualitative research is about “interpreting data by observing what people do or say” and researching the “meanings, concepts, definition, characteristics, metaphors, symbols and description of things”, quantitative research is more objective as it includes a wider number of respondents and is evaluated in numerical data (Anderson, 2006, p. 3). Interviews, direct observation and analysis are all qualitative methods while questionnaires fall under quantitative methods. Another method is the case study, which “focuses its attention on a single example of a broader phenomenon” (Gerring, 2004, p. 341). Eventually, the decision on which method is the most appropriate will be led by the research questions.

Table 1: Research Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Question</th>
<th>How can Development Cooperation be Improved to Increase the Effectiveness of Aid?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub Questions</td>
<td>1. What are the Challenges impeding Development Cooperation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. What are the Key Principles for improved Development Cooperation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. How are Donors performing in respect to improving Development Cooperation?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the following parts the author will first provide a justification for the selected methods followed by a detailed description of why the selected approaches are deemed the most suitable.

2.1. The Choice of Method

The choice of the best reasoning method is an important one, as it will shape the structure of the thesis. The option lies between a deductive, and an inductive approach or a combined approach of the two. The deductive approach consists in deducing a hypothesis from a theory and in testing the former based on findings. The observations made will then allow the hypothesis to be either affirmed or rejected (Bryman, 2008, p. 10). Logically, the inductive approach moves the other way: from specific observations to establishment of patterns. Those patterns then form the basis on which a tentative hypothesis is formed and at last a theory established (Burney, 2008, sl. 5). Due to limited time sources and based on the research question, the author decided on the deductive approach.

Owing to the research topic and the chosen deductive approach the author decided to follow a qualitative research method while quantitative secondary data will be consulted to support the
findings. The mix of qualitative and quantitative research offers the most balanced and academic approach as both have their advantages and disadvantages. The strength of qualitative data is that it “provides complex textual descriptions of how people experience a given research issue” and therefore offers the human side, contextualising discussions (Mack et al., 2005, p. 1). As qualitative research gives a ‘human’ insight, it is often considered to be subjective. To create equilibrium quantitative research will be consulted, offering an objective view seen that it is based on statistics and the evaluation of numerical data. The assumption that quantitative data makes is that everything can be measured and explained scientifically. Although it offers a good and reliable source for comparison it tends to generalize and oversimplify complex contexts (Matveev, 2002, Para. 7). For the literature review the author chose to consult secondary qualitative and quantitative data. As for the findings primary data will be gathered through expert interviews and case studies.

2.2. Data Collection

The most relevant data that will be discussed in the literature review will be gathered through thorough desk research. The sources compiled will stem from secondary data such as recent academic journals and official publications by the EU, the OECD and other well-known organisations or authors in the subject matter. The review will provide some explanations and maybe also answers to a set of sub-questions. The questions for the interviews and the focus of the case studies were based on the data collected.

2.3. Interviews

Apart from secondary data the thesis will be supported by primary data such as the interviews conducted with experts of the subject matter. The objective of the interviews was to get an insight into the most recent discussions on the topic and to add professional expertise. The author expects to receive confirmation or even new insights to some findings presented in the literature review and to hear the interviewee’s opinion. For this purpose the author chose to conduct semi-structured interviews, offering the advantage that while all interviews follow the same common thread, the interviewer has the freedom to change the sequence of the questions and to probe for more information if deemed appropriate (Gilbert, 2008, p. 246). Conducting interviews is beneficial as it adds to the secondary data and offers a more comprehensive and detailed picture. Limitations are that they are prone to bias and thus not suitable for generalisations (Boyce & Neale, 2006, p. 3-4).

The transcribed interviews were subjected to a content analysis, which is “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p.1278). Through the coding system around a set of common themes the analysis of the interviews was facilitated (Gilbert, 2008, p. 259). The analysis of the interviews was based on a thematic analysis enabling
identification of recurring themes. In the findings chapter similar themes were grouped together, providing an insight into the views of the experts and enabling a comparison between all the answers. As some interviews were conducted in German the cited section were translated into English.

2.3.1. The Interviewees
The four interviewees were selected on the basis of their professional background and their added value to the thesis. They were contacted in due time via mail and all gave their consent to be cited.

The combination of an official from DG DEVCO, a journalist and two academics working in different areas provide a good combination of different experiences and insights. While both academics work for the same institute they still have a different background. The diverging vitae’s of all the interviewees also offer a greater spectrum of expertise and opinion. Although prone to bias, the objective of the interviews was to hear the interviewees’ opinion on a set of issues and not to gather facts, as was the aim of the case studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jost Kadel</td>
<td>Secended National Expert to the Directorate General for Development Cooperation – EuropeAid from Germany. Before: Aid Effectiveness Commissioner for the German Ministry for Development Cooperation (BMZ), responsible for among others preparing the High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness in Paris, Accra and Busan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monika Hoegen</td>
<td>Freelance specialised journalist in development policy with a focus on structural cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Guido Ashoff</td>
<td>Head of Department on Effectiveness of Development Policy for the German Development Institute (GDI).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Mark Furness</td>
<td>Works for the German Development Institute (GDI) in the department of Bi- and Multilateral Development Policy. Thematic focus: External Relations, EU Development Policy and Security and Development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: The Interviewees

Citation Issues
The interviews were transcribed word-by-word and provided with row numbers facilitate citing. The in-text citation of a citation by an interviewee could in this regard look like this:

“...” (Kadel, 43f)

Figure 8: Example In-Text Citation Interviews

As all interviewees agreed to be cited with their real names, the in-text citation will start as usual with the last name of the person cited, followed by the line in which the citation can be found. Should the number be followed by an f then this refers to the following line or lines. Some of the interviews were conducted in German and later translated into English. For the thesis only the English citations are used. In the appendences the first page of each transcribed interview can be
viewed in the original language in which the interview was conducted. Upon request the entire transcripts can be consulted at any time.

2.4. Case Studies

The choice to extend the research to case studies was made against the backdrop that through the interviews not all questions could be answered. Case studies however feature limitations in terms of their replicability, validity and reliability (Kohn, 1997, p. 6). In order to research the extent to which EU donors and thus their respective national development agencies have implemented the key principles of the Paris Declaration and the Code of Conduct, case studies are considered as advantageous. Due to limited time, the author chose to research the performance of three donors: Germany, France and the United Kingdom. This decision was made upon three considerations: representation, language barriers and capacity. Firstly, Germany, France and the United Kingdom represent the three biggest donor countries within the European Union in terms of ODA disbursement. In 2010 Germany spent the most of all EU Member States with 8035.51 USD millions, followed shortly by the United Kingdom with a total of 8016.8 USD millions and finally, France is the third biggest donor in the EU in terms of ODA disbursement with 7786.96 USD millions⁶ (OECD, n.d.). Secondly, language barriers had to be taken into account even though it would have been interesting to incorporate the performance of New Member States. Finally, addressing the issue of capacity, three case studies present a balanced number to make some comparisons. Researching more donors would have made the research more comprehensive but due to limited time the author focused on only three. The performance of the countries will be analysed based on seven principles and assessed in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Principles for the Case Studies</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ownership &amp; Alignment</td>
<td>How well is the donor translating the principles of ownership and alignment into its development cooperation policy? Is their a commitment to division of labour?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Harmonisation &amp; Division of Labour</td>
<td>How well is the donor translating the principle of harmonisation into its development cooperation policy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reduction of priority countries</td>
<td>Has the donor made commitments to decrease the number of priority countries?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ODA Commitments</td>
<td>What was the ODA level of the donor from 2009–2011. Has it reached the 2010 target of 0.51% GNI and in which direction is the donor heading?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a. Focus on three sectors per country</td>
<td>Has the country been reducing the number of priority sectors to three per partner country?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b. Sectors based on focal areas of donors</td>
<td>Are the sectors of cooperation based on the focal areas of the donor as defined by UNECE?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5c. Sectors agreed between donors and partners</td>
<td>Do the sectors of cooperation mirror in the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP) written by the partners? Are the sectors agreed between the donors and the partners?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: The Principles for the Case Studies

---

2.4.1. Selection of the Principles

Those seven areas represent the key aspects for good development cooperation and have emerged throughout the literature as pivotal in order to increase the effectiveness of aid. Ownership, Alignment and Harmonisation are the three first principles enshrined in the Paris Declaration. Division of Labour, reduction of priority areas, focus on three sectors per country and basing the sectors of cooperation on the focal areas of the donors reflect all in the EU Code of Conduct. The author also chose to add the level of ODA to the list to research how the selected countries are performing in this respect, as it is an important part of increased aid effectiveness. Finally, point (5c) was selected as to research whether ownership and alignment are only empty pledges made by donors or whether in reality they are also implemented.

The findings of the case studies will be presented in a grid offering the advantage of direct comparison of the performance between the donors. The findings for the case studies stem primarily from the OECD DAC Peer Reviews done in 2008 for France and done in 2010 for Germany and the United Kingdom, as this seemed to be the most reliable source of information, as on a regular basis the OECD, an organisation with an outstanding reputation, assess the performance of its members in development policy, more specifically on the implementation of the commitments made at the HLF. Moreover, the websites of the donor agencies (Germany: BMZ, France: AFD and UK: DFID) were consulted. It is important to point out that while the findings of the OECD DAC Peer Reviews can be taken for well researched, they are not necessarily up to date anymore. The review of Germany and the UK was done in 2010 and the one of France dates back to 2008. Furthermore, the information distributed on the websites of the donor agencies had to be taken, as the author did not have the means to check their validity.

Before the findings of the interviews and the case studies are presented, the next chapter will form the theoretical background for the thesis, discussing major challenges of development cooperation, the core principles to improve development cooperation and increase the effectiveness of aid and finally, the implications of uncoordinated action.
3. Literature Review

This chapter forms the academic framework for the thesis, discussing the most relevant and recent literature on the subject matter. The review is divided into three main parts. 1) Firstly, the author will start by introducing the major challenges development cooperation currently faces; 2) Secondly, ways to increase aid effectiveness and improve development cooperation will be brought forward; 3) Thirdly, an overview will be given on the negative impacts of uncoordinated action. The sources for the discussions will stem from the most central and relevant literature that has emerged around the topic in the past years. The chapter will end by summarizing the key lessons learned.

3.1. Major Challenges of Development Cooperation

3.1.1. Economic Crisis, ODA & CPA

When in 2007 the economic crisis hit the USA and later spread towards the rest of the world, this had an impact on Official Development Assistance (ODA) provisions. The IMF defines ODA as contributions of donor government agencies to developing countries (‘bilateral ODA’) and to multilateral institutions (IMF, 2003, p. 191). Some years earlier in 2002 in Monterrey it was agreed that donors would dedicate 0,51% of their Gross National Income (GNI) to ODA by 2010 and by 2015 increase it to 0,7% of GNI to ODA. Contemporarily the environment is not the same anymore as when the commitment was made and donors in the EU and around the world are struggling to reach the targeted percentages. The graph below illustrates the ODA level in 2011 of the Member States and in which direction they are going in view of the 2015 target. Out of the graph it becomes evident that unfortunately the trend is towards decreasing, rather than increasing, ODA.

![Figure 10: Gap between 2011 ODA levels and 2015 targets](image)

(Council of European Union, 2011, p. 6)
During the conference organised by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID), Debrat, Deputy Director General of the French development agency AFD states that there is a sense of urgency and arguments in favour of European development cooperation considering that through the economic crisis there is a real risk of budget concentration and public opinion’s rejection (ODI, 2009, p. 50). Keeping the commitment to increase aid is also a highly discussed topic in the EU and as Horký (2010) argues is based on “political will and public support” (p. 12). Currently the public support to increase ODA is faltering. A survey commissioned by the Directorate-General (DG) Development and Cooperation and conducted by TNS Opinion & Social (2011) found out that in 2011 50% of the EU citizens are for increasing ODA. Although this percentage has not changed compared to 2010, the number of citizens for a decrease of ODA has increased from 2010 to 2011 from 14% to 18% (p. 23).

Horký (2010) gives a plausible reason for this, saying that public support towards increasing ODA is not shaped out of humanitarian considerations but is rather related “to the existence of Diasporas and to the perception of global problem as threat to domestic stability” (p. 12). Taking into account that the economic crisis is currently one of the biggest threats to domestic stability, especially in Europe, public support to increase ODA will most likely decline. However, when ODA decreases this does not yet have to have a negative effect for the recipient countries as Birdsall et al. (2009) explain:

A substantial portion of what is termed “official development assistance” does not represent actual transfers of funds to partner countries. Donors can make a greater

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*TNS Opinion & Social, 2011, p. 23*
development impact by increasing the share of aid that donors program to support development projects in their partner countries (p. 25).

The “aid that donors program to support development project” is called country programmable aid (CPA) and it is the part of ODA that remains once all that is not programmable at the country level, such as debt relief, humanitarian aid, in-donor costs and unallocated aid are deducted. In their assessment of the quality of Official Development Assistance Birdsall et al. (2009) measure whether the 23 OECD DAC members and eight multilateral agencies are holding up to their commitment to improve the quality of aid. The 31 donors are tested in four dimensions (maximizing efficiency, fostering institutions, reducing the burden on recipient countries and transparency and learning) against a total of 31 indicators. In their study the authors also calculated the country programmable share, showing that in 2009 as much as 19 donors received negative results, demonstrating a rather low CPA share.

![High country programmable aid share](image)

Figure 12: High Programmable Aid Share

Due to the fact that CPA still remains a big part of ODA if ODA decreases, so will the CPA level. Evidently this goes primarily to the disadvantage of recipient countries. The need to improve how aid is delivered and thus increase its effectiveness therefore becomes more and more pressing.

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(Birdsall et al., 2009)
3.1.2. The Security Development Nexus…

Since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 the architecture of development policy changed, creating an ever more evident nexus between security and development in external actions. This change is a direct result of new global threats emerging in the post-Cold War environment and after the 9/11 events. Evidently, the priority of some developed countries shifted after the 2001 attacks from a focus on civil society and development policy to a fixation on military and security (Holtz, 2010, p. 6). In 2003, Javier Solana, former High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, makes the remark that “Security is a precondition of development” (EU, 2003, p. 2). But as Gavas (2006) rightly points out in the Reality of Aid 2006 report, Mr. Solana might have failed to recognise that “development might also be a pre-condition for security” (p. 271).

Already in 1996 Scheel saw the connection between the two when he said that “development policy is security policy” (as cited in Hoebink & Stokke, 2005, p. 270). In his study, Günther Maihold (2005), critically discusses the repositioning of development policy within security policy, concluding that it must go hand in hand with changes on the operative level as well as internally and externally. On the operative level he suggests to keep an efficient instrument at hand to manage the interface and to test new forms of cooperation. Internally he advises a clear task division and externally he recommends staying realistic and not to overstretch competences as this might have regressive outcomes. Four years after the suggestions made by Maihold, the Lisbon Treaty is ratified. For one the Treaty reiterates, what the Maastricht Treaty already stipulated in 1992 in a clearer wording, that “the Union’s development cooperation policy and that of the Member States complement and reinforce each other” (Treaty of Lisbon, 2009, art. 208(1)). Moreover, the Treaty creates the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security and for the establishment of European External Action Service (EEAS), providing thus for some of the changes recommended for by Maihold. What Maihold calls ‘regressive outcomes’ are also underlined by Corre (2009) who states, “In the name of security and stability, aid can end up being driven by security interests of the donor rather than by the development interests of the recipient.” (p. 53).

3.1.3. …and the Issue of National Interests

Corre’s statement underlines the importance that interests of donor countries shall not impede on the development priorities of the recipient countries. The reality, however, often looks different. McCormick & Schmitz (2009) argue in their paper that political imperatives affect coordination in three ways. First, donors do not want to give up their right of autonomous action. In short, this means that everyone wants to coordinate but no one wants to be coordinated. Second, the donors have an obligation towards the taxpayers showing them value for their taxpayer money, offering an explanation to the reluctance of some donors to work together, as “coordination activities with
those of other agencies is feared to slow down the speed at which programmes and projects can be introduced and executed”, resulting in a lower amount of “visible project with political appeal to home country voters”. Third, there is a sense of competition between donor agencies resulting in reluctance to exchange information and experience. This is also due to the fact, that donor agencies see a big disadvantage in coordinating activities because “joint initiatives make it more difficult to develop a clear donor profile with innovative features” (p. 21–22). Horký (2010) and Seters & Klavert (2011) support the argument saying that in the European Union national interests and profiling opportunities prevail, working against a coordinated European approach. Horký (2010) makes the point that especially for the New Member States (NMS), “the aid effectiveness agenda is sometimes viewed as a threat to national interests” (p. 12). Not least because “policies improving aid effectiveness, coordination and policy coherence for development (PCD) aim at reducing the role of the domestic actors by increasing the use of partner-country systems” (Ibid, p. 18). As the next chapter will show, the use of recipient country systems is, however, regarded as beneficial and as the right way to ensure that national interests do not conflict with the priorities of recipient countries.

3.2. Ways to Increase Aid Effectiveness and Improve Development Cooperation

3.2.1. Ownership & Alignment

As already stated earlier and as Horký (2010) rightly points out, “national interests undermine the efforts for strengthening the ownership of partner countries (p. 12). Moreover, “proliferation tends to undermine country ownership and bureaucratic quality” (Knack & Rahman, 2004, p.16). The principle of ownership was an addition in Paris to the previous aid effectiveness agenda in Rome. In the Paris Declaration it was listed as the first principle defined as, “partner countries exercis[ing] effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-ordinat[ing] development actions (Paris Declaration, 2005, p. 3). The International Good Practices Principles for Country-Led Division of Labour and Complementarity compiled by the OECD also mentions Partner Country Leadership as the first principle. For this matter the OECD encourages partner countries to “take the lead in initiating, catalysing, and overseeing the division of labour process, given that this will decide how donors provide support to the implementation of the national development strategy” (OECD, 2009, p. 6). A workshop organised by Brookings (2010) came to the conclusion that “donors remain far too eager to lead, despite empirical evidence that aid programs that are truly owned by recipients have the biggest impact” (p. 1). In his Working Paper Booth (2011), confirms this, saying that development works best when it is country owned (p. 15). Ownership and thus development can however only work if donor countries align and respect the priorities set by partner countries as well as the roles they allocate to the donors. Hoegen (2008) underlines this point by an example of the cooperation between Germany and Indonesia, stating
that against the will of the Indonesian government Germany decided to end support in the health sector and to instead concentrate on climate change, decentralisation and economic erection (p. 26). Along the lines of Hoegen it is important that recipients but mostly donors understand that ownership is also a question of sustainability. On the one hand, because it counteracts projects and programmes to disintegrate once donors exit a given sector or country. On the other hand, ownership avoids duplication of efforts as the recipient country has a much better overview of where it needs more support and where already enough donors are helping out. Avoiding duplication of efforts therefore requires a harmonised approach between donors through division of labour between donors, leading to complementarity.

3.2.2. Harmonisation: Coordination through Division of Labour to Increase Complementarity

Although the Lisbon Treaty defines development cooperation as a policy area of shared competence in which the EU and the Member States have their individual policies (2009, art. 208), Bigsten et al. (2011) point out that according to Article 210 of the Lisbon Treaty, “effective coordination of aid programmes is a legal obligation for the Union and the Member States” (p.14).

The European Consensus enshrines coordination, establishing a shared framework based on common values, principles, and objectives of EU’s development policy, while the EU Code of Conduct sets “the rules of engagement within which Member States deliver bilateral programmes” (Gavas et al., 2010, p. 3). According to the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), “development coordination aims to harmonise measures for promoting development in such a way that they interact to achieve the optimal impact” (2002, Glossary). In the Paris Declaration under the principle of Harmonisation, division of labour is presented as a ‘measure’ to avoid aid fragmentation and instead increase complementarity, which has the ‘optimal impact’ of reducing transaction costs and therefore increasing the effectiveness of aid (OECD, 2005, p. 6).

Buscar et al. (2007) support the argument of division of labour as a measure to increase efficiency (e.g. reduction of transaction costs), effectiveness (e.g. sector and geographic concentration) and a stronger role for the European Union in international development cooperation (p. 1). Bigsten et al. (2011) once more point out, that uncoordinated parallel approaches can have economic implications such as increased transaction costs, making reference to the negative effects of donor proliferation and aid fragmentation (p. 14). In their study the authors clearly distinguish the positive effects coordination can bring through division of labour, distinguishing between the “cost saving effect” (reduction of transaction costs) and the “governance effect” (the increased effectiveness by which development objectives in the partner country can be reached). The authors however stress, that the “political costs”, referring to a loss of national sovereignty and the ability to pursue national objectives can stand in the way of a coordinated approach (Ibid, p. 8).

3.3. The Implications of Uncoordinated Action
3.3.1. Donor Proliferation, Aid Fragmentation & Aid Orphans

Donor proliferation and aid fragmentation are two interconnected phenomena. While donor proliferation refers to the increasing number of donors in a country or sector, aid fragmentation is a term describing the result of donor proliferation. In his analysis Bürcky (2011) defines donor proliferation as the sum of the sectors that collectively receive only 10% of the donor’s CPA. Aid fragmentation is defined as sum of donors who in a sector collectively account for only 10% of the CPA spent in the sector (Bürcky, 2011, pp. 12-13). If the number of donors providing aid in a given sector increases, aid fragmentation is the unavoidable result. Bürcky’s (2011) study on behalf of the OECD Task Team on Division of Labour and Complementarity, found that the number of EU donors per sector grew by 8.9% from 2005 to 2009 (p. 29). This is a shocking development considering that in 2005 in Paris and in 2008 in Accra commitments were made to decrease the number of donors per sector. Chandy (2011) makes evident the problematic of donor proliferation, explaining that it goes to the detriment of effective aid as it creates an imbalance between investment as well as increased transaction costs for both the donor and the recipient country. He concludes by saying that it undermines “the sustainability of investments and that the fragmentation of aid into smaller interventions is associated with lower efficiency (pp. 8-9). Along those lines the analysis and empirical evidence sustained by Knack & Rahman (2004) provide evidence that “competitive donor practices, where there are many small donors and no dominant donor, erode administrative capacity in recipient country governments” (p. 24). Roodman (2006) and Kharas (2009) confirm this assertion through later studies. Taking into account the increasing numbers of new donors from the emerging BRICS, the new Member Sates in the European Union and the numerous private organisations and NGOs, it can be assumed that both donor proliferation and aid fragmentation will not improve in the coming years. That is why it is of even greater importance to improve complementarity and division of labour among the donors and, as Knack & Rahman suggest, creating leader donor arrangements in recipient countries (p. 26).

As the EU Toolkit for the Implementation of Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy (2008) registers, “in many countries donor congestion continues to be a major cause of fragmentation and duplication and of a heavy organisational and administrative burden.
leading to high transaction costs, for both partner countries and donors” (p. 6). Donor congestion is thus a direct result of donor proliferation, creating a landscape of ‘darling’ and ‘orphan’ countries. While some countries receive too much aid, others receive too little. The ‘darling’ countries suffering under donor congestion have a hard time implementing the support they receive as they spend most of the time on administrative tasks. Vietnam serves as a good example for how donor congestion can negatively affect a recipient country. In 2007, the country welcomed 752 delegations from donor countries, which were either already implementing projects or planning to do so in the future. This meant that the country had to welcome about two delegations per day, making it nearly impossible for the government to govern (Hoegen, 2008, p. 25). Robert Zoelleck, president of the World Bank, described this phenomenon as ‘development tourism’ (as cited in Hoegen, 2008, p. 25). The reason for this imbalance is often that some countries have a better quota in implementing aid effectively. This is often due to their somewhat more stable government. Donors therefore prefer supporting those countries, as positive outcomes in the recipient countries means more support by the taxpayer, who eventually finances the programmes implemented in partner countries. The ‘aid orphans’ are therefore the fragile countries for whom it is even harder to develop, as their support from abroad is lower due to a marginal success rate.

3.4. Summary

This chapter reviewed the literature surrounding the challenges of development cooperation and ways to improve development cooperation. Moreover, the author presented the implications uncoordinated actions can have especially for recipients of aid. As for the challenges the author discussed the decreasing allocation of ODA as percentage of GNI, the broader development agenda and especially its interconnectedness with security and national interest as the pivotal challenges to development cooperation and as a result to increasing aid effectiveness. As concerns ways to move forward and improve development cooperation, ownership, alignment and harmonisation through division of labour were presented as the key principles. Finally, the impacts of uncoordinated actions were presented. These include donor proliferation, aid fragmentation, donor congestion and the negligence of ‘orphan’ countries.
4. Findings

This chapter will provide an overview of the evidence gathered through the research. While the interviews were chosen to answer the first and second sub question, case studies were selected to research the last sub question. The findings of the research will thus be presented in two parts. In the first part, the results of the interviews will be outlined. The second part will present the data derived from the case studies of three donor countries. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a short summary of the key findings.

4.1. Interviews

The author interviewed four experts in the area of development cooperation. Through their professional experience the interviewees provided the author with valuable insight into the issue of improving development cooperation in view of increasing aid effectiveness.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jost Kadel</td>
<td>Seconded National Expert to the DG DEVCO-EuropeAid from Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monika Hoegen</td>
<td>Freelance Journalist specialised in development policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Guido Ashoff</td>
<td>Head of Department on Effectiveness of Development Policy, GDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Mark Furness</td>
<td>Bi- and Multilateral Development Policy, GDI</td>
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During the interviews five common themes central to the research questions could be distinguished around which the chapter will be structured, collating the experts’ views. While the first theme gives a general idea on the thought of the interviewees on development cooperation, theme two and three are the principles the interviewees emphasized as being most important for good development cooperation. The fourth theme addresses the challenges of development cooperation and finally in last part the interviewees had the opportunity to give their recommendations for the future. The five themes provide answers to the first and second sub question.
4.1.2. Findings of the Interviews

The findings of the interviews are divided thematically into five parts: 1) Firstly, the importance of coordinated and harmonised action will be outlined; 2) Secondly, the interviewees will clarify why the principle of ownership is so crucial; 3) Thirdly, the significance of division of labour will be addressed; 4) The fourth part outlines some major challenges of development cooperation; 5) and finally, the interviewees share their recommendations for improved cooperation in development policy.

Theme 1: The Importance of Development Cooperation and Coordinated Action

When asked how important a coordinated development policy among donors is all interviewees agreed that it was very important. Hoegen repeated the example World Bank President Zoelleck gave of the 700 delegations that came to Vietnam in 2007, emphasizing that what happened there was “complete nonsense” (Hoegen, 120). Hoegen underlined her point of view with yet another example. Hoegen says that coordinated action is very important because otherwise there is a risk that multiple schools will be built, but for example no aid prevention will be provided. She compares this to a wedding, where the “bridal couple has a wish list so as to avoid receiving 27 irons and not the toaster that they urgently need” (Hoegen, 124f). It is therefore crucial that the invitees coordinate themselves to avoid giving things twice and concentrate on giving only things the couple really needs. In this metaphor, the bridal couple represents the partner country and the invitees the donors. Kadel agrees with Hoegen providing another good metaphor, which illustrates the need for good coordination and cooperation. He says, “if there is no golden thread, which expresses itself through coordination, then it is just like a soccer team without a trainer that does not know the rules and runs totally uncoordinated over the playing field and does not get anything done” (Kadel, 22f). Ashoff considers improved cooperation to be “very relevant since in the past two decades the number of donors has increased considerably” (Ashoff, 42f). He also makes the point that per donor country there are also multitudes of implementing organisations, which need to be coordinated as “they increase the fragmentation of the donor landscape” (Ibid, 47f). Moreover, Ashoff brings the point of effectiveness to prominence, saying, that due to the increased number of donors it “inevitably comes to duplications” but also to an “overload of the partner countries” which costs money and increases transaction costs (Ibid, 53f). Furness agrees that coordination is of “crucial importance” but he points out that it is a “process” and that it is impossible to ever say, “ok, now we are coordinated” (Furness, 54f).

Theme 2: Ownership

All interviewees consider ownership a central aspect for good cooperation. Kadel states that without ownership and without using the country systems, but using parallel structures instead
development cooperation is not sustainable, because once the donors exit a certain sector or country the project will “collapse like a house of cards” (Kadel, 184f). Kadel also says that it is essential that partner countries emancipate themselves and communicate more clearly what they want and most importantly lead development cooperation (Ibid, 295f). Kadel mentions Rwanda as a positive example of a partner country that has done well in the past in this respect and he, therefore, hopes that there will be “more Rwandas in the future” (Ibid, 301f). Hoegen agrees on this point with Kadel referring to her metaphor of the bridal couple, she says that for improved cooperation “the bridal couple, thus the partner countries, have to be clearer and say what they need and what they do not need” (Hoegen, 128f). Hoegen laments, that unfortunately this is often not the case due to missing structures and corruption in partner countries. Hoegen however points out, that “it takes considerable self-confidence for a partner country to say we need this and this, but we do not need you”, as this might mean that the country is not on the level of a developing country anymore (Ibid, 133f). Furness considers ownership to be of “crucial importance”, seen that the recipients have an “initial role in the process” and “at the end of the day, partner countries have to develop themselves” (Furness, 65f). Ashoff agrees with the others, saying that “ideally it should be the partner countries coordinating the donors”, because it is essentially about “improving the living standards of the partners” (Ashoff, 65f). Ashoff adds, “coordination among donors is only successful if it complies with the priorities, strategies and capacities of the partner countries” (Ibid, 68).

**Theme 3: Division of Labour**

Along the lines of effectiveness, Ashoff stresses that the “effectiveness of development cooperation can be improved substantially through pooling resources, as for instance through better division of labour” (Ashoff, 57f). Ashoff emphasises, “division of labour is no self purpose” (Ibid, 109). Ashoff remarks, that if in a sector not 20 donors but only five donors provide support and those five coordinate themselves it can be a lot more efficient and effective than when 20 donors are active in a given sector in an uncoordinated manner (Ibid, 127f). Kadel affirms Ashoff’s position comparing fragmentation to a watering pot. If donors pour their water over a multitude of sectors then they are “nowhere really visible, nowhere really significant” (Kadel, 235f). He thus makes the point, which is supported as well by all other interviewees, that it is essential about improving the donor’s visibility. Kadel states, “effectiveness in development cooperation can only be reached through better coordination, in the European context but also beyond” and considers the EU Code of Conduct to be the “European initiative par excellence in the matter of better coordination and division of labour”, as it provides the EU with a clearer profile and results, to some extent, into the EU speaking with single voice (Ibid, 33f; 143f; 36; 146). Hoegen makes an
even stronger point saying, “internationally no one can allow oneself to say that we do not need to coordinate and that we do not need more effective development cooperation” (Hoegen, 465f). Hoegen and Kadel agree that progress is slow. Hoegen states, that “everyone wants it and the Code of Conduct is certainly something good but in practice progress is slow” (*Ibid*, 235f). Kadel says “progress is a snail” but in general it is going in the right direction (Kadel, 80f). Along those lines Ashoff points out that at least in terms of reducing the number of partner countries progress has been made (Ashoff, 188f). Ashoff however stresses that a “reduction of partner countries does not automatically result in an improved division of labour” if it is not done in a coordinated manner (*Ibid*, 194f). Without coordinated reduction this could lead to a chaotic process in which certain development countries are being disregarded and turn into ‘aid orphans’ (*Ibid*, 195f). Ashoff therefore states that in terms of the implementation of the EU Code of Conduct it “cannot be said that there has been no progress, but it is also not possible to say that it has been fully implemented” (*Ibid*, 205f). Ashoff emphasizes, that one has to differentiate between countries and sectors when assessing the progress of the EU Code of Conduct (*Ibid*, 201). According to Kadel, improving coordination and development cooperation, is easier in Europe, seen that “we have more possibilities to coordinate ourselves” and because “we are relatively close to each other in the European context” compared to other donors such as America for example (Kadel, 37f).

**Theme 4: Challenges**

One issue that modifications of the development policy poses, is the effort it takes to persuade government official of the changes (Kadel, 66). Kadel stresses that although all the reference papers for aid effectiveness express a certain political will they are often “superimposed by other political interests” (*Ibid*, 204). Hoegen agrees with Kadel and says that other challenges are also strategic interests and historic ties. So for example France and the UK will most likely continue providing aid to their former colonies (Hoegen, 148). Another challenge for improving cooperation and finding a harmonised strategy Hoegen points out, is, that donors have different thematic focal points and different approaches, which she calls “diverging philosophies” (*Ibid*, 150f). Furness consents arguing, “different people have different interests” (Furness, 108). Another major challenge Hoegen points out is the changing governments of the donors, who then sometimes also change the focal points (Hoegen, 164). Kadel says on this, that when in 2010 the German government changed so did the development policy resulting in a considerable set back (Kadel, 84). Diverging programming cycles of the donor countries are, according to Hoegen, another challenge. They can even become a “pretext”, brought forward by many donors, explaining why improved coordination is hard to achieve (Hoegen, 137f). Kadel, however, points out that at least the new European Development Fund will counter this by “synchronising programming to the
Hoegen argues that the new donors also pose a challenge for the EU. Especially China can be seen as a sort of rival, as China does not impose as many conditions as the European donors. Instead they tie their aid to the condition, that they can use the partner countries’ resources and that Chinese will be the ones implementing the projects, creating a “new competitive situation” (Ibid, 212f). Furness sees a challenge in “everybody getting on the same page” and agreeing, which “obviously is a problem when you get more and more actors who want to take the lead”, (Furness, 102f). In short, he says, “everybody agrees that there is a need of coordination, but nobody wants to be coordinated by anybody else” (Ibid, 104f).

Theme 5: Recommendations

As a first step to improve coordination Hoegen suggests to improve coherence in the donor countries themselves and their implementing institutions (Hoegen, 241f). Ensuring that one ministry does not implement a policy, which would be counterproductive from the point of view of development cooperation, is essential (Ibid, 244). Hoegen states that in Germany development policy and trade policy unfortunately often work diametrically opposed (Ibid, 299). This affirms what Ashoff stated in the first part, saying that the multitude of implementing organisations in donor countries need to be coordinated. Ashoff adds that also partner countries should increase their coherence, seen that they are also not “monoliths” having themselves different institutions with diverging interests (Ashoff, 175f). Furthermore, Hoegen stresses that it is very important that conflicting interests and focal points must stop (Hoegen, 250). According to Hoegen, the role of NGOs should be reinforced, as it would avoid many of the problems that occur if only states work together (Ibid, 254f). Finally, Hoegen argues that there is “no need for new conferences on the wording”, which supports Kadel’s argument, that the Paris Declaration and other initiatives that followed to improve aid effectiveness are based on the wealth of experience coming from experts in the field (Hoegen, 254; Kadel, 180). Both thus agree that there is not so much the need for technical improvements but for increased action in implementing initiatives such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour.

4.2. Case Studies

In this part the case studies on Germany, France and the United Kingdom will be presented. The three donor countries were selected based upon the fact, that they are the three biggest donors in the EU in terms of ODA disbursements. In 2010 Germany spent the most of all EU Member States with 8035.51 USD millions, followed shortly by the United Kingdom with a total of 8016.8 USD millions and finally, France is the third biggest donor in the EU in terms of ODA disbursement.
with 7786.96 USD millions\(^\text{10}\) (OECD). In addition, researching the donors’ performance did not face a language barrier. Finally, due to limited time the author chose to assess only three donors. Despite the fact that it is not comprehensive and representative it still provides a basis for comparison.

The seven principles, upon which the donors are to be assessed, reflected in the literature as important aspects for good development cooperation. Ownership, alignment and harmonisation are the first three principles addressed in the Paris Declaration. Division of labour, reduction of priority countries, focus on three sectors per country and whether sectors are based on focal areas of donors are all listed in the Code of Conduct. Point (4), the level of ODA, researches whether the donors are keeping to their commitments made in Monterrey. Point (5c) has been selected as to research whether ownership is also really exercised in practice or if it just a promise made by the donors.

In point one and two it will be assessed whether the country has implemented ownership, alignment and division of labour, while point three will research whether progress has been made in terms of geographic concentration. Point four will take a look at the ODA levels as percentage of GNI from 2009 to 2011, checking whether the donor has reached the 2010 target and if the 2015 is within reach. Finally the last point is divided in three sub points. Point five will assess the performance of the donor in two of its partner countries. In the first country, which is accentuated as it is underlined, represents a country in which the donor is lead donor according to the EU Fast Track Initiative, the second country was picked randomly. Choosing a second partner country by

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chance offered the advantage to see whether the donor are performing better in those countries compared to first country under assessment. In the first sub point it will be researched whether the donors are providing aid in only three sectors in each country, as to avoid donor proliferation. The second sub point compares whether the sectors reflect the focal areas of the donors. This assessment will be made in the basis of the development cooperation paper compiled for each donor bei United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Finally, the last point will take look at whether the principle of ownership and alignment are reality. This assessment will be based upon whether the sectors of cooperation are agreed upon with the partners and whether they reflect in the PRSPs of the partner country

Although more aspects could have been researched in the case studies, those seven represent the most central ones. Most importantly, due to restricted methodological capacity these seven areas can be researched with the limited time at hand. The main sources for the case studies were the most recent OECD DAC Peer Review reports on the donor countries. The findings of the case studies are presented in a table enabling a direct comparison of the performance of the three countries and their national development agencies (Germany: BMZ; France: AFD; United Kingdom: DFID).

The outcomes of the case studies are presented in a table as to increase comparison on the donors’ performance. A short overview of the performance of each country per point will nevertheless be given first. The detailed information is however to be found in the table below. The headlines given each donor for each point mirror the findings and were given by the author.

4.2.1. Overview of the Findings

As for the implementation of ownership and alignment, France and the United Kingdom are performing best, having both a partnership agreement on which they are basing their cooperation. In terms of harmonisation and the implementation of division of labour the United Kingdom is a clear frontrunner, being very proactive and flexible due to its country offices. While France is still facing some major problems in terms division of labour Germany has made improvements to increase internal coherence. Regarding geographic concentration on priority countries all three donors have started to reduce the number of partner countries. However, Germany and France seem to still face the most problems, while the United Kingdom is performing best. On the percentage of GNI allocated to GNI, the UK still takes first place, followed by France and then Germany. Although Germany’s ODA is very low with only 0,40% GNI in 2011 it has been increasing compared to the year before. France faced a set back and the ODA level of 2011 was inferior to the one in 2010. Although lagging behind the set target both countries remain committed to reach the 2015 goal of 0,7% GNI to ODA. The UK is again doint best in terms of
ODA and is even considering to enshrine the 0.7% GNI to ODA into UK law. As for the reduction to three sectors per partner country, Germany is doing best having focused on only three sectors in both countries. France has been keeping its commitment in Madagascar, while in Haiti France is providing support in six sectors. The UK is doing worst providing support in four sectors in each partner country. As for the last principle all donors seem to have considerable difficulties in translating ownership and alignment into practice. Only France was doing very well in Madagascar.
### 4.2.2. Findings Case Studies: Germany, France & United Kingdom

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<th><strong>1. OWNERSHIP &amp; ALIGNMENT</strong></th>
<th><strong>GERMANY</strong></th>
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<th><strong>UNITED KINGDOM</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WEAK</strong></td>
<td>The principle of country ownership is integrated in BMZ’s guidelines. Whether German development cooperation is in line with national priorities depends on the partner countries’ capacities. Where Germany sees the need, it increases the capacity of partner governments. Alignment is also recognised but only weakly translated into practice. Although Germany finds it easier to use partner countries’ national strategies compared to using their budgeting system. Moreover, Germany is making efforts to use country systems (OECD, 2010a, p.74-78).</td>
<td><strong>MORE PARTNERSHIP</strong></td>
<td>France has introduced partnership framework documents (PFDs), which are conducive to ownership, alignment and harmonisation. They also offer improved aid predictability providing a schedule of actions by sector. However, the partner countries reviewed by the DAC felt to be only consulted very little during the formulation process (OECD, 2008, p.60-61).</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>POSITIVE</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Country plans are based on national poverty reduction strategies (PRS). Final decisions on which focus the UK will take are made at UK ministerial level, while the DFID takes a strong role defending the most appropriate strategy and the priorities of partner countries. A big part of the authority is delegated to country office level, making the UK more responsive to changing circumstances in the partner countries. Imposes conditionality on its assistance based on whether a partner country’s commitments are sound and focus on reducing poverty and reaching the MDGs. If a country cannot fulfil the criteria the UK disburses assistance through NGOs or the UN. Moreover, the DFID relies for the majority on partner country systems (OECD, 2010b, p. 74-75).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. HARMONISATION: DIVISION OF LABOUR</strong></td>
<td><strong>INTERNAL FRAGMENTATION (VOID)</strong></td>
<td><strong>COMPLEMENTARITY BEFORE DoL</strong></td>
<td><strong>A PROACTIVE &amp; FLEXIBLE LEADER</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany has been promoting cross-country division of labour in Europe and has increased sector concentration. Harmonisation within the German development cooperation system however remains an issue, making it hard to harmonise with other development partners if internally development cooperation remains highly fragmented (OECD, 2010a, p. 79). Since 2011, the DED, Inwent and GTZ have been merged to the GIZ. Having certainly improved the issue of internal fragmentation or making it even void.</td>
<td>France defends the diversity of aid instruments, which it tailors to national circumstances based on the comparative advantages of each instrument. France recognises the inevitability of DoL, but has still a lot to do in this respect (especially: geographical and sector concentration). France is however reluctant to enter into silent partnerships and prefers complementarity amongst donors based on comparative advantages based on instruments and sectors (OECD, 2008, p. 63).</td>
<td>The DFID is proactive in harmonising and coordinating its activities with other donors, which is enabled through country offices making it easier to adapt to certain environments. Due to the advantages the country offices bring with them, the DFID often assumes a leadership role. However, the DFID is also not reluctant to enter into silent partnerships, seeming unconcerned about lack of visibility. In the majority of cases the DFID however took up the role of leader (OECD, 2010b, p. 76-77).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3. REDUCTION OF PRIORITY COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GERMANY</th>
<th>FRANCE</th>
<th>UNITED KINGDOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT</strong></td>
<td><strong>CONCENTRATION &amp; NEGLECTION</strong></td>
<td><strong>AMBITIOUS BUT NOBLE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany has already limited the number of priority countries from 84 to 57, however in total Germany works in 140 countries worldwide adding 83 non-partner countries to the 57 priority countries. 40% of German ODA goes to the priority countries, while the other 60% are allocated to the non-partner countries. Moreover, in 2008 six out of the top 20 recipients of German ODA were non-partner countries (OECD, 2010a, p. 51). The BMZ works in 61 countries.</td>
<td>Franceworks in 67 countries out of which 55 are in the Priority Solidarity Zone (ZSP). The ZSP concentrates on the former French African colonies, which becomes evident, as 43 out of the 55 ZSP countries are located in Africa. In 2006, France allocated 70% of its bilateral aid to Africa, and 58% of this to sub-Saharan Africa, which is consistent with its commitment to allocate 2/3 of its aid to Africa. However, France is reducing its share of aid to the least developed countries (LDCs), with only 20% available to them in 2006 (OECD, 2008, p. 43-44). The AFD works in 67 countries.</td>
<td>Currently, 90% of the UK’s bilateral assistance is distributed to 23 countries. Since 2002, the UK has closed programmes in 36 countries and plans to continue doing so. The DFID however ensures, that this is done in a phased and predictable manner, consulting other donors as well. In 2004, the UK set the target that at least 90% of its bilateral programme will go to LICs (low income countries). This was successful in 2005-2008 in the future this could however be harder to reach as India has since graduated from low to middle income country (MIC) (OECD, 2010b, p. 49-50). The DFID works in 45 countries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STALLING</th>
<th>FALLING BEHIND</th>
<th>EXEMPLARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The net ODA as percentage of GNI was… 2009: 0,35% 2010: 0,38% 2011: 0,40%</td>
<td>The net ODA as percentage of GNI was… 2009: 0,47% 2010: 0,50% 2011: 0,46%</td>
<td>The net ODA as percentage of GNI was… 2009: 0,51% 2010: 0,56% 2011: 0,56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German government recognised that it would miss 2010 target but is still committed to achieve the 0,7% target for 2015. This would mean that Germany would have to double its aid over the next year (OECD, 2010a, p. 49).</td>
<td>France remains committed to reach the 2015 target of 0,7% GNI, after it barely missed the target for 2010. However, in 2011 the ODA as percentage of GNI France dispersed decreased and fell back to the percentage of 2009.</td>
<td>In 2004 the UK made the commitment to reach the 0,7% target by 2013, which it reiterated since in 2009 in its fourth White Paper on International Development. Moreover, plans are made to enshrine the 0,7% ODA/GNI target in law (OECD, 2010b, p. 48).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4. ODA COMMITMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set targets</th>
<th>2010: 0,5% GNI</th>
<th>2015: 0,7% GNI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>STALLING</strong></td>
<td><strong>FALLING BEHIND</strong></td>
<td><strong>EXEMPLARY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The net ODA as percentage of GNI was… 2009: 0,47% 2010: 0,50% 2011: 0,46%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tbody>
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## Challenges and Key Principles - How to Improve Development Cooperation and Increase Aid Effectiveness

**Alix Reichenecker**

### 5a. Limit to 3 Sectors per Partner Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>GERMANY</strong></th>
<th><strong>NEPAL</strong></th>
<th><strong>FRANCE</strong></th>
<th><strong>HAITI</strong></th>
<th><strong>UNITED KINGDOM</strong></th>
<th><strong>YEMEN</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GHANA</td>
<td>NEPAL</td>
<td>MADAGASCAR</td>
<td>HAITI</td>
<td>KYRGYZSTAN</td>
<td>YEMEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Agriculture and food security</td>
<td>1. Local self-government and civil society</td>
<td>1. Improve living conditions by contributing</td>
<td>1. Education</td>
<td>1. Emergency response</td>
<td>1. Emergency response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Health</td>
<td>5. Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. Co-funding of NGOs</td>
<td>6. Co-funding of NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GERMANY**

- **Ghana**
  - 1. Agriculture and food security
  - 2. Decentralisation
  - 3. Sustainable economic development

According to BMZ website Ghana agreed with Germany on those sectors. Nevertheless, decentralisation is not a priority area according to Ghana’s 2006 Annual Progress Report. The Report addresses however ‘enhancement of decentralisation’.

**NEPAL**

- 1. Local self-government and civil society
- 2. Renewable energies and energy efficiency
- 3. Sustainable development

The BMZ website states, Nepal agreed with Germany on those sectors. According to Nepal’s PRSP renewable energies and energy efficiency are however not listed.

**FRANCE**

- **Madagascar**
  - 1. Improve living conditions by contributing
  - 2. Economic development
  - 3. Sustainable development

According to AFD website Madagascar agreed with France on those sectors. The PRSP of Madagascar also lists those sectors as important for their development.

**HAITI**

- 1. Education
- 2. Urban facilities and infrastructure
- 3. Agriculture
- 4. Microfinance
- 5. Health
- 6. Co-funding of NGOs

The AFD website does not mention that the sectors of French cooperation are based on an agreement between Haiti and France. All sectors are however recognised as important by Haiti’s PRSP, besides co-funding of NGOs.

**UNITED KINGDOM**

- **Kyrgyzstan**
  - 1. Health
  - 2. Government and civil society
  - 3. Population policies/programmes and reproductive health
  - 4. Social infrastructure and services

On the DFID an agreement between Yemen and the UK on the sectors is not mentioned. Emergency response and food security are however not listed in Yemen’s PRSP.

**YEMEN**

- 1. Emergency response
- 2. Social infrastructure and services
- 3. Development food aid/food security assistance
- 4. Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security

On the DFID an agreement between Yemen and the UK on the sectors is not mentioned. Emergency response and food security are however not listed in Yemen’s PRSP.

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The Hague School of European Studies
4.3. Summary

4.3.1. Interviews

All four interviewees recognised the importance of development cooperation and the need for coordinated action. They agreed that uncoordinated actions are ineffective and go to the detriment of aid effectiveness. Ashoff lists duplication of efforts, overload of partner countries and increased transaction costs as negative effects of uncoordinated action. According to the experts a better division of labour as well as increased ownership by the partner countries would counter those effects. As for division of labour, Kadel considers the EU Code of Conduct to be the European initiative to improve development cooperation at least in the European context. Ashoff, however, stresses that a reduction of partner countries as recommended by the CoC does not necessarily improve division of labour if it is not done in a coordinated manner. Ownership is recognised as a key aspect of good development cooperation. Through ownership programmes and projects are more sustainable and directly address the needs of the partner country. According to all interviewees some major obstacles persist such as national interests and the issue of ensuring visibility. Another challenge is the governments of donor countries themselves. Firstly, because it can be hard to convince government officials of the needed change; and secondly, because changing governments can signify new and changed approaches. Differing programming cycles of donors are also named as a problem to improve development cooperation as well as the increased number of donors and their diverging approaches (e.g. China). In order to improve development cooperation the experts suggest, as a first step, to increase coherence not only within the donor but also within the partner countries themselves. Hoegen stresses the need to put aside conflicting interests. Finally, there is a consensus among the experts, that there is no need for new initiatives, as the Paris Declaration and the EU Code of Conduct are based on the wealth of experience. Instead they call for more action in their implementation since so far progress has only been slow.

4.3.2. Case Studies

In the case studies Germany, France and the United Kingdom were assessed on their performance based on seven points. The outcomes diverged greatly from country to country and from point to point. The UK scored best as regards the first three points followed by France. Germany seems to have the most work to do in those areas. When Germany was reviewed by the OECD DAC group, the merger of the three agencies: DED, Inwent and GTZ into the GIZ was however not yet realised. This has certainly improved the issue of internal fragmentation in Germany. Also in terms of ODA as percentage of GNI the UK seems to be doing best. As for the performance in the partner countries themselves the picture differs from donor to donor and from partner to partner. While Germany did best as to the reduction of three sectors per partner and in terms of whether the sectors are based on the focal areas of the donor, all donors seem to have trouble translating ownership and alignment into practice.
5. Discussion

In the two previous chapters the topic as to how development cooperation could be improved in order to increase the effectiveness of aid was thematically discussed. This chapter will bring the literature review and the findings of the interviews and the case studies together to answer the research questions by which the thesis was guided:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Question</th>
<th>How can Development Cooperation be Improved to Increase the Effectiveness of Aid?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub Questions</td>
<td>What are the Challenges impeding Development Cooperation?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 19: Research Questions

This chapter will be divided according to the three sub-chapters, which themselves provide answers to the main questions, namely: 1) Firstly, the major challenges that impede development cooperation; 2) secondly the key principles that are essential for improving development cooperation; and finally, 3) the performance of the three selected case study donors in overcoming the challenges and implementing the key principles to improve development cooperation will be discussed.

5.1. What Impedes Development Cooperation?

Despite all the initiatives launches and achievements made in the past years, some major challenges still impede an improved development cooperation, which would increase the effectiveness of aid and the materialization of the MDGs.

5.1.1. National Interest

The most pivotal challenge that development cooperation must overcome is the national interest of donors. Although it is hard to pin down what the implications of national interests on the effectiveness of aid, the literature review and the interviews distinguished them as the pivotal hurdle that needs to be overcome.

In the literature review, Horký (2010) exemplifies this, saying that donors consider initiatives such as the Paris Declaration and the EU Code of Conduct as a threat to their national interest as they try to increase the effectiveness of aid by reducing the role of donors by enhancing the use of partner systems. Seters & Klavert (2011) as well as the McCormick & Schmitz (2009) all agreed that political imperatives affect coordination and in turn affect the effectiveness of aid.

What has been researched in the literature review was confirmed through the interviews with the experts. All interviewees agreed that national interests impede development cooperation. Moreover, through the interviews the author was able to gather some examples as of how national
considerations can stand in the way of development cooperation. Firstly, the changing governments within the donor country can become an issue for development cooperation, as they lead to changing approaches and thematic focal points (Hoegen, 164f). Based on Kadel’s experience as former Aid Effectiveness Commissioner of the BMZ, he considers convincing government officials of changing agendas for the sake of more aid effectiveness as a challenge (66). Notwithstanding, the author want to point out, that changing governments should not only be considered as a challenge but also as an opportunity for change and improvements.

5.1.2. Broader Donor Landscape

In the past years the number of donors has increased significantly. Although no data could be found on the actual increase of donors in the past years, the developments within the European Union already underpin this point. Since 2004, the European Union has enlarged considerably, counting today a total of 27 Member States. Taking into account that many of the twelve new Member States\(^{12}\) were still recipients before their accession, since then they have now become donors in their own right while at the same time still receiving some support. This gives an idea as to how the donor landscape has broadened in the past years solely within the EU.

Next to the increase of donors in the EU, new bigger donors beyond the European Union are entering the scene. The so-called emerging countries, the BRICS, are rapidly increasing their share of aid. India was for many years one of the UK’s priority countries and classified as a LIC, now however the country is a big donor. It is important, however, to remark that, despite the fact, that emerging countries are becoming influential donors, countries such as India and South Africa are still struggling with high poverty rates in their countries (Human Development Reports, 2007). Nevertheless, these new donors, the BRICS, pose an opportunity and a threat. On the one hand, an opportunity, because they increase the level of ODA, which can potentially increase aid effectiveness. On the other hand, they pose a considerable threat. The Chinese approach to disbursing aid stresses the point that it is not the amount of money made available, but most importantly the manner in which aid is given that has the biggest impact on aid effectiveness. China for this matter does not make their aid conditional to any good governance policies, as European donors sometimes do. Instead Chinese aid is tied to two conditions. Firstly, the Chinese have access to the natural sources of the country in which they provide aid and secondly, the programmes are implemented by their countrymen and not by nationals of the recipient country. Clearly this approach goes to the detriment of the sustainability of programmes. Not only are natural resources exploited but also the principle of ownership is not adhered to.

\(^{12}\) In 2004, the EU welcomed ten and in 2007 two new Member States.
Another good example given in the literature review underlining the argument that the increasing number of donors is a challenge to development cooperation is the situation in Vietnam in 2007, and which Robert Zoelleck referred to as “development tourism” (as cited in Hoegen, 2008, p.25). In that year the country welcomed 752 delegations from donor countries, meaning that on average Vietnam hosted two delegations every day (Hoegen, 2008, p.25). This is a good example of the negative effects too many donors have: donor congestion, donor proliferation, aid fragmentation and negligence of ‘orphan’ countries. Again the need for coordinated action, geographic and sector concentration, ownership and better cooperation between all actors becomes evident. As a first step to counter the negative effects of the broadening donor landscape Hoegen and Ashoff suggest to increase the coherence in the donor and the recipient countries themselves. Although internal interests within the countries could make increased coherence troublesome, it would already be a way of ensuring that donors and recipients speak with one clear voice (Ashoff, 175f; Hoegen, 241f).

5.1.3. Other Challenges: Decreasing ODA & Security-Development Nexus

Next to those two major challenges, the author would still like to address two other issues, which are also considered to pose a threat to improving development cooperation.

Firstly, the ODA level as percentage of GNI has not increased the way intended after the conference in Monterrey in 2002. While in the EU some donors such as Sweden can be considered as a real role model with a 1,02% of GNI allocated to ODA in 2011 - trend increasing; only three other Member States (Luxembourg, Denmark and the Netherlands) are already way beyond the target of 2015. However for those three last countries, the trend is towards decreasing rather than increasing ODA. For the other countries the statistic does not look optimistic, with a general trend to decreasing rather than increasing ODA (see Figure 12). Evidently, this is due to the economic crisis and the budget choices governments have to make. It would however be desirable that decreasing ODA levels do not go to the detriment of aid effectiveness. Therefore better cooperation and coordination could be good solutions to decrease transaction cost and improve the outcomes, despite the lesser money available.

Secondly, in the literature review, the broadening development agenda and the development security nexus were named as threats to development cooperation. Again this is greatly linked to national interests. During the interviews security considerations were not among the issues named. However, it is important that for the sake of aid effectiveness security interests should not be put before development interests, impeding development cooperation.
5.2. What are the Key Principles for Improved Development Cooperation?

Before presenting ownership and division of labour as coordination tools, the importance of coordination will be discussed.

5.2.1. Coordination

Coordination of aid programmes was presented in the literature review as a crucial tool and even legal obligation, being enshrined in Article 210 of the Lisbon Treaty, to promote complementarity and increase efficiency. The implications of uncoordinated action, such as donor congestion, donor proliferation, aid fragmentation and negligence of ‘orphan’ countries have been outlined in the literature review and briefly touched upon in Chapter 5.1.2., stressing the importance for all actors to improve cooperation through better coordination among themselves. The interviewees all substantiated the centrality of coordination as to enhance aid effectiveness. Although shocking, the example of the congestion of donors in Vietnam in 2007 was a useful negative model demonstrating what a lack of coordination can mean for development cooperation and the sake of aid effectiveness. The metaphors of Kadel and Hoegen of the soccer team without a coach and the wedding without the wish list nicely visualise the implications of uncoordinated action.

5.2.2. Ownership

Ownership is a way to increase coordinated action. Ownership ideally means that partner countries themselves decide which donor they want to receive support from in which sector. This decision can be based on historical ties, but should optimally be based on the comparative advantages a donor can offer in a certain sector.

Ownership has two key advantages. Firstly, the aid of donors is directly targeted at the areas which the partner country see require support. Evidently, partner countries are best situated to make those choices, not only because the aim is to help the development of their country but also because they are on site, which a numerous of donors are not. Secondly, ownership brings with it a very practical advantage. Through ownership duplication of efforts are reduced, as the recipient countries is aware of gaps as well as the areas were enough donors are already providing support.

All interviewees consent that ownership is one, if not the key principle to increase aid effectiveness. Kadel brings forward another argument in favour of ownership and the use of country systems, saying that using parallel structures is not sustainable. By stating this he means that if a donor uses different structures than the country systems, there is a big chance that once the donor exits a given sector or country, the programme will disintegrate (Kadel, 184f). An issue that remains regarding ownership is the emancipation of partners. This means that some partners still lack the confidence to clearly state what they need. Sometimes this is also due to the missing structures and corruption within the partner countries themselves. Hoegen puts forward the argument that partner countries might fear to receive less aid if they say that they need this and that
donor but do not need aid for something else, as this might mean that the recipient is no longer a developing country (Hoegen, 133f).

5.2.3. Division of Labour
That division of labour is beneficial for the effectiveness of aid is pretty evident, as it decreases transaction costs and reduces the likelihood of duplicated efforts. Division of labour is a way for donors to share the burden and increase complementarity.

As Bigsten et al. (2011) would say, division of labour has a “governance effect”, meaning that through division of labour, development objectives in the partner country can be reached a lot easier (p. 8). In his interview, Ashoff stressed that division of labour is “no self purpose”, but necessary to increase the efficiency of the aid that is delivered (Ashoff, 109; 127f). With his metaphor of the watering pot, Kadel exemplifies that if donors do not coordinate themselves through division of labour but instead distribute their aid the way a watering pot waters the plants, then the donor works in a range of sectors and countries but is “nowhere really visible, nowhere really significant” (Kadel, 235f).

An obstacle to DoL is according to Bigsten et al. (2011) “political costs” (p. 8). Those costs refer to a loss of national sovereignty and the ability to pursue national objectives. Hence, national interests are again named as the major obstacle to improve development cooperation. Division of labour does however not just mean reducing the number of donors in a given sector or country, instead it is essential that donors coordinate among themselves who exits and who stays, as uncoordinated division of labour could result in creating more ‘orphan’ countries and would finally go to the detriment of the aim to increase the effectiveness of aid (Ashoff, 194f).

5.3. How well are donors performing?
In this sub-chapter the author will instead discuss the implications of the donor’s performance, structuring the discussion around the seven principles upon which the three donors were assessed in the case studies: ownership and alignment; harmonisation through division of labour; geographic concentration; ODA level; sector concentration; sectors based on comparative advantages and translating ownership and alignment into practice.

5.3.1. Ownership & Alignment
Ownership and alignment are two principles, which are easily confounded, but it is important to understand that they refer to different things. Ownership refers to when “partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies” whereas alignment is when donors adjust their support to partner country’s systems (OECD, 2005, p.3; p.6).

Based on the research done it seems that ownership is a principle to which each country has its own approach. While Germany makes ownership dependent on the capacity of the partner country,
France seems to still face problems concerning the consultation of partner countries during the formulation process. The UK continues taking most decision on the ministerial. Yet, due to the country offices they have, the ministers are well informed of the needs of the population. Whether the locals are directly integrated in the formulation of priorities could unfortunately not be researched. Moreover, UK aid is conditional on a partner country’s commitment to reaching the MDGs, if this condition is not fulfilled the UK still disburses aid, but through other channels.

As for alignment, in the three countries assessed only two out of three (France and UK) had, partnership agreements with their partner country. Germany however did not use partnership agreements, but stated that the sectors in which it provides support are agreed upon with the partners.

5.3.2. Harmonisation: Division of Labour
A second key principle discussed earlier is division of labour through which complementarity and harmonisation can be increased. In this respect all countries seem to be doing well. As a reaction to the OECD DAC Peer Review of 2010 of Germany, which criticised the country’s internal fragmentation, the government decided to merge three donor agencies into one. France for its part is still reluctant to enter into silent partnerships and prefers instead division of labour based on the comparative advantages of the donors. Due to the country offices the UK is suited best to perform the role of lead donor in division of labour. However, according to the OECD DAC Peer Review 2010, the UK does not see problems in entering into silent partnerships.

5.3.3. Geographic Concentration
In terms of geographic concentration the case studies found that all three countries were making progress, but that there were still some inconsistencies. In Germany, for example, 60% of the aid goes to the 83 not-priority countries. Despite first improvements in geographic concentration, the number of priority countries should continue to be decreased. It is evident, that this will take time, as donors cannot just exit from one day to another as programmes have a lifespan of multiple years. To prevent the negligence of some countries, it is essential that donors coordinate their geographic concentration. Through the research it could not be establish whether this was happening.

5.3.4. ODA Level
Although all countries assessed stand to their commitment to reach the 2015 target of 0,7% GNI to be allocated to ODA, only the UK seems on a good way to reaching that goal. Among the three countries, the UK is also the only to have reached the 2010 target. Although the three countries are the biggest donors in the EU in terms of disbursement, they are only on place five (UK), nine (France) and ten (Germany) when comparing them to the ODA level as percentage of GNI of all EU countries in 2011 (see Figure 12). Whereas this is deplorable, it was discussed before that it is
an evident reaction to the economic crisis and can be balanced through better development cooperation and coordination.

5.3.5. Sector Concentration
Sector concentration is important for better division of labour. As for sector concentration the three donors were assessed in two of their partner countries. In this respect Germany performed best regarding the commitment to concentrate on three sectors. France came off badly in Haiti, working in a total of six sectors. Due to the earthquake that hit the country in 2010 this is justifiable. The UK works in four sectors in each of its two partner countries assessed. Through the case studies the author could however not find a justification as to why donors are working in four or even six sectors instead of three as agreed upon in the EU Code of Conduct.

5.3.6. Basing Sectors on Comparative Advantages (Focal Areas) of Donors
That the sectors in which the countries provide their support should be the sectors in which they have a certain comparative advantage seems logically. Fortunately the majority of the sectors assessed coincided with the focal areas of the donors. On a percentage base Germany did best. Of the six sectors, only one sector does not match with Germany’s focal areas, leading to a percentage of 16,7%. France is based on second place with 3 out of 9 sectors, resulting in a percentage of 33,3%. UK scored worst with 37,5% of the sectors it provides support in not being based on its focal areas.

5.3.7. Implementing Ownership & Alignment
On the last principle the outcomes were rather disillusioning. Here the author wanted to research whether the commitments made to ownership and alignment also reflect in reality, taking two partner countries per donor as a basis.

As for ownership, all the websites of national development agencies stated that the sectors in which the donors are providing their support are agreed upon with the partners (with the exception of Haiti). Unfortunately the author could not verify the validity of this information.

Therefore, in the next step the author tried to assess the level of alignment. By reading through the PRSP of the partner countries the attempt was to see whether the priorities, which the partners have set themselves, match the sectors in which the donors are providing support. Again there are limitations to this approach, as it cannot be established, whether the donors and partners have agreed on other sectors, apart from the ones listed in the PRSP, due to the comparative advantages of the donors. Despite this consideration the outcome was rather mediocre. The average grade the author gave was ‘ok’. While France scored a ‘very good’ in Madagascar, it received an ‘ok/poor’ in Haiti and the UK a ‘poor’ for its performance in Yemen.
5.4. Summary

In conclusion, through the research the author was able to find answers to the questions. The objective was to research how development cooperation among donors and recipients could be improved as to increase the effectiveness of aid and to advance the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. To this end the author researched the main challenges impeding and the key principles improving development cooperation as well as the performance of three donors.

As for the challenges that need to be overcome to improve development cooperation, the author could determine two central issues. Firstly, national interests remain the most influential challenge to development cooperation, as donors remain reluctant to give away their sovereignty. Secondly, the growing number of donors in the donor landscape, despite the opportunities this includes, poses a major hurdle in terms of cooperating in an effective way as the more donors there are the harder it is to find common ground.

The manner in which all actors cooperate and coordinate among themselves is the most important principle through which development cooperation can be improved and the effectiveness of aid increased. Coordination refers on the one hand to ownership, and on the other hand to division of labour. Ownership is of crucial importance as it guarantees that the support provided by the donors directly target the needs of the partners. As for ownership to work it requires sound structures in the recipient countries and increased emancipation of partners. Division of labour is beneficial as it is a good way to share the burden, decrease transaction costs and prevent duplication of efforts.

With respect to the performance of the donors assessed it can be concluded that after the initiatives signed to improve development cooperation action followed. Despite those efforts much still remains to be done if donors really want to improve development cooperation and significantly increase the effectiveness of aid. Considering that Germany, France and the UK are among the biggest donors in the European Union their progress however remains marginal.
6. Conclusion

The objective of the thesis was to research how development cooperation could be improved in view of increasing the effectiveness of aid and reaching the Millennium Development Goals. As to answer the main question the research was guided by three sub questions. While the first and second sub question directly linked to the main question, the third question was added to provide an insight on as to how the three donors selected, Germany, France and the United Kingdom are performing based on a selected number of points central to development cooperation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Question</th>
<th>How can Development Cooperation be Improved to Increase the Effectiveness of Aid?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub Questions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the Challenges impeding Development Cooperation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the Key Principles of good Development Cooperation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are Donors performing in respect to improving Development Cooperation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 20: Research Questions

In this chapter the thesis will be summarised and critically reflected: 1) firstly, the methods selected to conduct for the research will be presented; 2) secondly, the main findings derived from the literature review as well as the interviews and case studies will be resumed; 3) on this ground some recommendations will be given; and 4) finally a conclusion will be drawn.

Concluding Summary

First of all, the thesis started with an introduction into the subject matter, highlighting the key activities in development cooperation and aid effectiveness that have been initiated in the past years at the global as well as at the EU level. Moreover, the most pressing issues were presented, demonstrating the need for improved development cooperation. In addition, key terms were defined and the research questions introduced.

In the second part, the research method that shaped the thesis was presented. On the basis of the research question the author chose to follow the deductive approach. As for the secondary data quantitative material as well as other qualitative sources on the subject matter were consulted and discussed in the literature review. In terms of gathering primary data the choice was made, to follow a qualitative method. Here the author decided to use two methods: interviews and case studies.

The next chapter, the literature review, discussed the secondary data, building the theoretical framework for the thesis. The literature review was structured around the first two sub questions. While the first part researched the main challenges, the second part reflected the key principles scholars discussed with regards to development cooperation. Moreover, the implications of uncoordinated action were pointed out.
Here it was concluded, that the decreasing ODA level, national interests, and the broader development agenda through the security-development nexus constituted the main challenges. Moreover, ownership, alignment and division of labour emerged as the key principles to improved development cooperation. Finally, the implications of uncoordinated action, such as donor proliferation, aid fragmentation, donor congestion and negligence of ‘orphan’ countries were highlighted.

The fourth part continued by presenting the findings of the interviews and the case studies. The interviews with the experts were collated around five common themes: the importance of coordinated action; ownership; division of labour; challenges and recommendations. In the case studies three European donors: Germany, France and the United Kingdom were assessed based on seven points deemed as central for development cooperation.

Finally, before coming to the conclusion, the fifth chapter linked the findings of the literature review as well as the interviews and case studies together with the research questions. In this way, the author was able to answer the research questions.

**Main Findings**

**Challenges Impeding Development Cooperation**

In the literature review three main challenges were distinguished as impeding development cooperation: the decreasing ODA level; the national interests of donors and the broadened development agenda, including a security-development nexus. Through the interviews with the experts it was confirmed that national interests are detrimental for effective development cooperation. Moreover, the interviews named incoherence within the donor countries and the broadened donor landscape as challenges to development cooperation.

**Key Principles for Improving Development Cooperation**

The preliminary research revealed ownership, alignment and harmonisation through development cooperation as the key principles for improving development cooperation and all interviewees confirmed this. Unsurprisingly those principles also reflect in initiatives such as the Paris Declaration and the EU Code of Conduct. Reaching the conclusion that these principles are thus the key to improve development cooperation is therefore not surprising as they are based on a wealth of experience.

**The Performance of Donors**

Assessing which principles are the most important to improve development cooperation was a question of receiving confirmation to an assumption the author had already made. Through case studies the research was extended to investigate how donors are performing on the most important points for improved development cooperation. As an overall conclusion it can be said, that all
donors have made first commitments and steps into the right direction, however much remains to be done if they want to truly increase the effectiveness of aid.

**Recommendations**

Owing to the research a set of recommendations can be made:

**National Interests:** Despite the fact, that it is difficult to leave out national interests in politics, it is of crucial importance, that donors learn to set their interests aside and focus development cooperation merely on the development of the partner countries. Own benefits should be disregarded if they go to the detriment to the partner countries.

**ODA level:** The commitment agreed upon in Monterrey made in 2002 to increase ODA was made many years before the economic crisis, which had a negative impact on reaching the targets set. Nevertheless it is a question of credibility to keep to the commitments made. If donors cannot increase the level of ODA that should at least see to it that the share of CPA increases by improving how aid is delivered.

**Donor Landscape:** The fact is, that more and more donors are entering the scene. It is important to take this as an opportunity to increase the effectiveness of aid. If national interests can be set aside, development cooperation focuses on improving the living conditions for nationals in partner countries, and if the process is steered by the partner country much more can be achieved. This however requires a better coordination of and among the donors.

**Ownership:** Throughout the thesis it has been stressed that ownership is crucial for development cooperation to work and to increase the effectiveness of aid and reach the Millennium Development Goals. Ownership is however still not used at its full potential. It is important that the ownership by partner countries of the development cooperation process is increased and wherever weak structures and corruption are working against ownership, the capacity of partner countries needs to be increased.

**Division of Labour:** First good steps have been taken among donors to improve division of labour. The EU Code of Conduct was the European initiative par excellence in this matter. Progress has however only been slow and diverging programming cycles of donors are working against it. Donors should therefore be more proactive in division of labour and accept to enter into silent partnerships just as well as take up the role as a lead donor.

**Germany:** Based upon the case study on Germany the country has to work on many areas. First of all partnership agreements should be set up. Secondly, the ODA level of Germany has to be raised considerably if the country is to reach the commitment it says it is still determined to reach. As for country concentration, Germany has decreased the number of priority countries, but is still working
in 140 partner countries worldwide, there is therefore enough room for improvement to reduce the number.

**France:** France needs to incorporate partner countries more in the formulation of partnership agreements and change its approach to entering into silent partnerships. As for country concentration France is doing well, but has to be careful to not neglect LIC in its disbursement of aid. In terms of ODA, France has decreased its share in 2011, which is deplorable. Regarding France’s sector concentration the country is rather doing well, despite the fact that it is active in six sectors in Haiti, as the earthquake that hit the country in 2010 can most likely explain this.

**United Kingdom:** Overall the UK is performing very well. A suggestion for the future to improve the UK system is to decrease the sectors in which it works in the partner countries and sector concentration should also be aligned to UK’s focal areas. Furthermore, the donor should increase its adherence to ownership and alignment in practice.

**Limitations**

For the thesis the choice of method proved to be suitable to answer the research questions. Nevertheless some limitations of the methods were revealed during the research. Firstly, despite the fact that the interviews were a good method to research the opinions of experts, for future research a wider range of experts, from more differentiated backgrounds should be interviewed. Secondly, concerning the case studies, the author considers as advantageous that a second method was included, as this added value to the thesis. However, with more time at hand it would have been interesting to check whether the information gathered is still valid or valid at all. For future research this should definitely be taken into consideration. It should however be taken into account that this might be cumbersome as the websites of the national agencies are not very transparent and the agencies themselves not very responsive. In the course of the thesis the author was already confronted with this obstacle. Finally, future research should be more comprehensive and include a wider range of donors and possibly even partner assessed.

**Conclusion**

All in all, through the research the author was able to give recommendations as to how development cooperation could be improved in view of increasing aid effectiveness and reaching the MDGs. Certainly, the author has not revealed considerably new data, nevertheless implementing the recommendations listed above would certainly improve the situation. Evidently national interest are however the biggest challenge that must be overcome and on the basis of experience it can be said, that in the past self-interest has shaped politics, including development cooperation. But if donors, but partners as well do not learn to emancipate themselves and to start looking beyond their own turf nothing will notably change in the coming years.
Challenges and Key Principles - How to Improve Development Cooperation and Increase Aid Effectiveness

Glossary

**Aid Effectiveness**

Since 2000 the target of development cooperation is to reach the Millennium Development Goals. Therefore, when talking about increasing aid effectiveness, the term refers to reaching the MDGs.

**Aid Fragmentation**

Aid fragmentation is defined as sum of donors who in a sector collectively account for only 10% of the CPA spent in the sector (Bürcky, 2011, p. 12)

**Alignment**

Alignment is when donors adjust their support to the partner country’s system, priorities, strategies, institutions and procedures (see OECD, 2005, p. 3)

**Complementarity**

Complementarity refers to “two or more things that are different but together form a useful or attractive combination of skills, qualities or physical features” (Wehmeier, 2000, p.246 -247).

**Coordination**

“Coordination is a form of cooperation requiring parties to pursue a common strategy in order to avoid the mutually undesirable outcome arising from the pursuit of divergent strategies” (Baylis *et al.*, 2008, p. 578)

**Country Programmable Aid (CPA)**

The “aid that donors program to support development project” is called country programmable aid (CPA) and it is the part of ODA that remains once all that is not programmable at the country level, such as debt relief, humanitarian aid, in-donor costs and unallocated aid are deducted (Birdsall *et al.*, 2009, p. 25)

**Development Cooperation**

Baylis *et al.* (2011) defines cooperation as being “required in any situation where parties must act together in order to achieve a mutually acceptable outcome” (p. 578). Development Cooperation is a term used to describe the interaction of various actors working together with the aim to improve the development of the recipient(s) receiving support. This cooperation can occur between donors but also between donors and partners.
Division of Labour (DoL)

Division of Labour in development policy refers to how donors based on their comparative advantages and for the sake of complementarity share the burden with the aim to increase the effectiveness of aid and decrease negative effects such as transaction costs, duplication of efforts (etc.).

Donor Proliferation

Donor proliferation is defined as the sum of the sectors that collectively receive only 10% of the donor’s CPA. (Bürcky, 2011, p. 13)

Harmonisation

Complementarity and Division of Labour are tools to reach Harmonisation. Harmonisation however refers to more effectiveness. And this effectiveness can only be reached if Complementarity and Division of Labour are coordinated.

Official Development Assistance (ODA)

The OECD defines ODA as “contributions of donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (‘bilateral ODA’) and to multilateral institutions” (OECD, Glossary of Statistical Terms).

Ownership

The Paris Declaration defines Ownership, as when “partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and coordinate development action” (OECD, 2005, p.6).
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Anderson, J. (2006). Qualitative and Quantitative Research. Imperial County Office of Education. California


European Union (2009, June). EU Toolkit for the implementation of complementarity and division of labour in development policy. Brussels: EU


OECD (n.d.). Division of Labour and Complementarity: Background. Retrieved March 23, from the OECD Web site: http://www.oecd.org/document/52/0,3746,en_2649_3236398_45459252_1_1_1_1,00.html


References for the Case Studies

Germany:


France:


United Kingdom:


Appendix I – Interview Jost Kadel

1 I: Dann würde ich einfach mal mit meinen Fragen anfangen
2 J.K.: Sehr gerne. Ich muss gestehen ich habe mich jetzt auch gar nicht vorbereitet
3 I: Ja perfekt, dann kommen die Antworten spontan.
5 I: Bevor ich anfange wollte ich noch mal sagen um was es überhaupt in meiner Bachelorarbeit geht.
6 Und zwar will ich die Koordinierung der Entwicklungspolitiken zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten und
7 der EU recherchieren. Inwieweit das abläuft und wie gut das abläuft. Mit einem Fokus auch auf
8 Deutschland. Und ich erhoffe mir durch das Interview, dass ich durch Ihre Erfahrungen einen
Einblick
9 bekomme und ein bisschen Beispiele, die ich dann vielleicht mit in meine Bachelorarbeit mit
10 einfliessen lassen kann. Ich habe jetzt so ungefähr zehn Fragen vorbereitet und bevor ich anfange
11 haben Sie noch irgendwelche Fragen vorab?
noch
13 einmal ganz kurz wo Sie studieren, was Sie studieren.
15 Praktikum in einer kleinen NGO.
16 J.K.: Ok. Gut. Und was ist das für ne Arbeit? Eine Magister Arbeit oder eine Bachelor Arbeit?
17 I: Eine Bachelor Arbeit.
18 J.K.: Mhm, ok. Ja gut.
19 I: Meiner erste Frage ist eher generell gefasst. Warum ist es denn überhaupt so wichtig, dass
20 Mitgliedsstaaten und die EU ihre Entwicklungspolitiken besser koordinieren? Was ist da Ihre
21 Meinung dazu?
22 J.K.: Ähm ja. Mann kann es vielleicht verkürzt sagen. Wenn es da nicht einen roten Faden gibt, der
23 sich in Koordination ausdrückt, dann ist das wie ein Fußballteam das keinen Trainer hat, das keine
24 Regeln kennt und das völlig unkoordiniert übers Feld stolpert und nichts geregelt kriegt.
25 I.: Ok.
26 J.K.: Ähm, also es wird viel gesprochen über die Wirksamkeit der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit,
ja.
27 Das ist ja ein ganz wichtiges breites Thema in der Entwicklungspolitischen Diskussion seit etwa
1995.
29 Entschuldigung. ...

(Full transcript can be viewed on request)
Appendix II – Interview Monika Hoegen

I: Ich würde dann erstmal damit anfangen mein Thema vorzustellen. Ich schreibe 1 gerade meine
2 Bachelorarbeit zur Koordinierung der ENTwicklungspolitken der Mitgliedsstaaten mit denen der
3 und spezialisere mich auf Deutschland und habe mich jetzt auch dafür entschieden es auf
4 auszuweiten. Um dann auch einen Vergleich ziehen zu können. Und mit dem Interview erhoffe
ich
5 mir einen Einblick zu bekommen durch ihre Erfahrung und vielleicht auch noch ein paar
Beispiele
6 miteinfließen lassen zu können in meine Arbeite. Ich habe jetzt ungefähr 10 Fragen vorbereitet.
Und
7 ich würde jetzt anfangen wenn Sie keine Fragen vorab haben.
8 M.H.: Im Moment nicht. Vielleicht gleich.
9 I: Erst einmal eine generelle Frage. Inwieweit haben Sie in Ihrer Arbeit als Journalistin
überhaupt mit
10 Entwicklungspolitik zu tun? Und in welchen thematischen und geographischen
Themenbereichen
11 arbeiten Sie?
12 M.H.: Ich arbeite Schwerpunktäßig zum Thema Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und zwar seit
über 17
13 Jahren. Seit ich mich selbstständig gemacht habe. Ich war frühere bei einer Lokalzeitung in
Köln. Der
14 Kölns Stadtanzeiger. Hatte dann aber die Möglichkeit durch ein Journalistenstipendium nach
15 Vietnam zu gehen. War dann über das Stipendium nur ein paar Monate in Vietnam, habe das
aber zum
16 Anlass genommen auch zu sagen ich möchte was Neues internationaler aufstellen. Und hab
dann
17 meinen Job bei der Zeitung gekündigt. Und arbeite seither, dass war 1995 eben zur
18 Entwicklungsländern.
19 I: Ok
20 M.H.: Vietnam war sozusagen der Einstieg. Und ich habe damals im Anfang die ersten zwei,
drei
21 Jahre in denen ich das gemacht habe sehr viel über Südostasien gemacht. Ich war viel in
Vietnam,
22 Kambodscha, Burma auch soweit es denn möglich war. Und Indonesien und so und hab dort
viel
23 damals aktuell berichtet. Es war ganz spannend weil es dort viele in dieser Zeit auch viele
Neuerungen
24 gab. In Vietnam 95 tat sich wirtschaftlich die Beziehungen zu Deutschland stellten sich neu auf.
Dazu
25 habe gearbeitet. Später dann auch Lateinamerika mehr in den Blick genommen. Bin dort auch
viel
26 gewesen. Vor allem auch bei den karibischen Ländern Cuba und so weiter aber auch später viel
in
27 Argentinien und Chile. Und habe dann auch kurz für eine deutschsprachige Zeitung dort
gearbeitet. ...

(Full transcript can be viewed on request)
Appendix III – Interview Guido Ashoff

1 G.A.: Ashoff.
2 I: Gute Nachmittag. Alix Reichenecker hier.
4 I: Ja.
6 I: Ja, gut. Ähm. Dann würde ich erst ein Mal damit anfangen Ihnen noch einmal zu erzählen um was es eigentlich in meiner Bachelorarbeit geht.
8 G.A.: Ja ganz kurz. Sie hatten es ja schon in Ihrer Email angedeutet.
9 I: Ja genau. Und zwar will ich die Entwicklungsarbeit in der EU zwischen den Gebern recherchieren
10 mit einem Fokus auf die Arbeitssteilung den EU Gebern.
12 I: Ja natürlich.
15 I: Ja ich rufe Sie gerade über Skype an, damit ich das Interview aufnehmen kann wenn das ok ist.
18 G.A.: Ja wir können es ja mal probieren ob es so geht. Wenn nicht sag ich es Ihnen dann, dann
19 müssten wir vielleicht noch mal über das normale Telefon versuchen.
20 I: Ok, dann versuchen wir es erst einmal so. Ich erhoffe mir eben mit dem Interview mit Ihnen, das
21 einen besserer Einblick zu bekommen und von Ihrer Erfahrung ein bisschen etwas zu lernen. Ich habe
22 insgesamt 10 Fragen vorbereitet und wenn Sie keine Fragen vorab haben dann würde ich einfach
23 loschießen.
25 Thema Arbeitssteilung zwar befasst habe, aber im Kontext der größeren Thematik der Wirksamkeit der
26 Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Ich habe jetzt nicht speziell das Thema Division of Labour so wie es auf ...

(Full transcript can be viewed on request)
Appendix IV – Interview Mark Furness